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DELEGATING PROCEDURE
Matthew A. Shapiro*
The rise of arbitration has been one of the most signiﬁcant developments in civil justice. Many scholars have criticized arbitration for,
among other things, “privatizing” or “delegating” the state’s disputeresolution powers and allowing private parties to abuse those powers
with virtual impunity. An implicit assumption underlying this critique
is that civil procedure, in contrast to arbitration, does not delegate signiﬁcant state power to private parties.
This Article challenges that assumption and argues that we can
address many of the concerns about arbitration by drawing on civil
procedure’s solutions to its own delegation problem. From summonses to
subpoenas to settlements, civil procedure pervasively delegates state
power during ordinary civil litigation. With these delegations comes the
potential for abuse. But rather than limit private parties’ access to delegated power before any abuse has occurred, civil procedure generally
polices its delegations for abuse after the fact. It does so in three main
ways: by rescinding delegated power, as in the appointment of discovery
masters; by withholding enforcement from an exercise of delegated
power, as in civil Batson; and by punishing abuse of delegated power,
as in Rule 11 sanctions. Civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines
allow the state not only to protect private parties from harm but also to
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avoid becoming complicit in private exercises of delegated power that
offend important public values.
Arbitration’s delegations of state power present many of the same
problems as civil procedure’s, and scholars have rightly criticized the
current arbitration regime for essentially writing a blank check to private parties. But whereas most scholars have focused on restricting
access to arbitration’s delegations by deeming broad categories of arbitration clauses unenforceable, this Article suggests adapting civil
procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines for arbitration. Even if courts
continue to enforce arbitration clauses more often than arbitration’s
critics would prefer, they should police arbitration’s delegations more
closely than the law now permits.
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INTRODUCTION
Private parties are performing an increasing number of functions
that were once discharged by the government. Indeed, privatization has
become so pervasive that some public law scholars have dubbed it the
“new religion.”1 While scholars have criticized this development on many
different grounds,2 one particularly prominent criticism is that privatization involves a problematic “delegation” of state3 power to private
parties.4
Dispute resolution has hardly been immune from the privatization
trend. One of the most signiﬁcant developments in civil justice during
the last few decades has been the mass exodus of private disputes from
public courts to private forms of dispute resolution, particularly arbitration.5 Many scholars have criticized arbitration in terms that echo some
of the criticisms of privatization more generally. In particular, some have
espoused various versions of what this Article calls the “delegation critique.” The gravamen of the critique is that the current arbitration
regime delegates state power to private parties and allows them to abuse
that power with virtual impunity. Judith Resnik has thus criticized arbitration for “delegating,” “outsourcing,” or “privatizing” the judicial function.6 David Horton has argued that the current arbitration regime
1. E.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229, 1229 (2003) [hereinafter Minow, Public and Private
Partnerships].
2. For a recent example, see generally Jon D. Michaels, Constitutional Coup:
Privatization’s Threat to the American Republic (2017) (criticizing privatization for undermining separation-of-powers principles).
3. For clarity, this Article uses “state” when referring to “the state” and “State” when
referring to one of the ﬁfty United States.
4. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1367 (2003) (analyzing the constitutional problems posed by the privatization of governmental functions).
5. For an overview of the controversy surrounding consumer arbitration, as well as
empirical ﬁndings conﬁrming its signiﬁcance, see generally David Horton & Andrea Cann
Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104
Geo. L.J. 57 (2015).
6. See Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and
Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2018) [hereinafter Resnik, Access] (manuscript at 174) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (referring to mandatory arbitration as a “delegation” of judicial power); Judith
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts,
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impermissibly delegates Congress’s lawmaking powers to private parties.7
A host of other scholars have worried that arbitration permits private parties to use procedure to effectively override, or opt out of, substantive law.8
Some scholars have even contended that arbitration involves the exercise
of such important state powers that it constitutes “state action” subject to
the strictures of the Constitution.9 Though reflecting somewhat different
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L.J. 2804, 2811 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes] (arguing that the current arbitration regime constitutes a form of
“outsourcing”); Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented
Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85
Fordham L. Rev. 1899, 1900 (2017) (describing arbitration as one facet of a broader
“privatization and relocation of process”); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process:
Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1793, 1809 (2014) [hereinafter Resnik, Privatization] (dubbing the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses a form of “privatization”); Judith Resnik, Procedure as
Contract, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 593, 619–21 (2005) [hereinafter Resnik, Contract] (using
the term “outsourcing” to describe the current arbitration regime); Judith Resnik,
Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based
Processes Are at Risk, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 521, 549 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik,
Uncovering] (same). Other scholars have used similar language. See, e.g., Peter L. Murray,
Privatization of Civil Justice, 15 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 133, 142 (2007)
(criticizing the current arbitration regime as “a kind of delegation of the judicial function
to private dispute resolvers”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The
Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 Hastings L.J. 407, 441 (2016) [hereinafter Shiffrin,
Remedial Clauses] (connecting concerns about arbitration to “the more general anxiety
about the privatization of legal functions”).
7. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 469 (2011)
[hereinafter Horton, Delegation]. Katherine Stone has made a similar argument. See
Katherine V.W. Stone, Employment Arbitration Under the Federal Arbitration Act, in
Employment Dispute Resolution and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace 27, 51
(Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
“expansive interpretation of the [Federal Arbitration Act] as a form of delegation of
judicial and legislative authority to self-regulating communities”); Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77
N.C. L. Rev. 931, 961 (1999) [hereinafter Stone, Rustic Justice] (noting “the extreme
degree of delegation to arbitration that is reﬂected in the [Supreme Court’s] recent [arbitration] jurisprudence”).
8. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and
the Rule of Law 33–52 (2013) [hereinafter Radin, Fine Print] (arguing that boilerplate
language in contracts perpetrates a form of “democratic degradation,” effectively erasing
state-created legal rights); Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96
N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 125) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing that a mandatory arbitration clause “virtually amounts to an ex ante
exculpatory clause, and an ex ante waiver of substantive rights that the law declares nonwaivable”); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
Yale L.J. 3052, 3075 (2015) (arguing that the current arbitration regime gives corporations
“the power, through contract, effectively to negate substantive law”); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33, 110–22 [hereinafter Schwartz,
Small Print] (citing empirical evidence that predispute arbitration clauses are meant to,
and do in fact, function as “prospective waivers of substantive rights”).
9. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rev.
81, 109–13 (1992) [hereinafter Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights] (arguing that
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concerns, each of these criticisms ultimately questions whether the state
should be coercively enforcing the products of private dispute resolution
without any meaningful scrutiny.10
While largely accepting the main thrust of the delegation critique,
this Article challenges one of its key assumptions, with implications both
for our understanding of civil procedure and for our policies toward arbitration. Scholars have rightly worried that the current arbitration regime
delegates signiﬁcant coercive power to private parties and that the
Supreme Court has construed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) so as to
deny courts adequate authority to review arbitral proceedings and
awards.11 The result is a system in which private parties and their chosen
arbitrators enjoy wide latitude to abuse delegated state power, violating
important public values in the process. Yet proponents of the delegation
critique tend to assume that civil procedure, in contrast to arbitration,
commercial arbitration involves state action because courts’ enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards implicates constitutional rights); Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public
Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 989–1017 (2000) [hereinafter Reuben, Constitutional
Gravity] (arguing that contractual forms of alternative dispute resolution can constitute
state action); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 577, 609–33 (1997) (same); Jean R.
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due
Process Concerns, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 40–47 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rethinking]
(same); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1711, 1742–67 (2006) (arguing that class
arbitration constitutes state action); see also Martha Minow, Alternatives to the State
Action Doctrine in the Era of Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet:
Directing Law to Serve Human Needs, 52 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 145, 154–56 (2017)
(expressing sympathy for the state action argument). But see Peter B. Rutledge,
Arbitration and the Constitution 127–69 (2013) (contesting arguments that contractual
arbitration constitutes state action); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action,
2005 BYU L. Rev. 1, 40–41, 48 (same).
10. See infra notes 311–314 and accompanying text. Scholars have leveled similar
criticisms against other forms of “procedural private ordering,” see Jaime Dodge, The
Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 Va. L. Rev. 723, 728 (2011), particularly
“contract procedure”—contractual provisions that purport to alter the procedural rules
that generally govern the resolution of private disputes in public courts. The most
prominent example is Kevin E. Davis and Helen Hershkoff’s article, which criticizes
contract procedure as a form of (interchangeably) “privatization,” “outsourcing,” and
“delegation,” and connects that concern to the worry that contract procedure forgoes
various “public goods” associated with adjudication. Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff,
Contracting for Procedure, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 507, 512–13 (2011). For another
example, see David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted
Conﬂuence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control,
35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1085, 1087 (2002) (discussing predispute procedural agreements and
courts’ role in enforcing them). These criticisms apply to arbitration a fortiori.
11. See infra section IV.A.1. For one example, see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 586–88 (2008) (holding that courts may not expand the grounds for modifying
or vacating an arbitral award beyond those provided in the FAA, even with the agreement
of the parties).
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vests state power largely with state officials and institutions.12 In fact, this
Article shows, civil procedure has already worked through its own delegation problem. Drawing on liberal political theory, this Article contends
that broad delegations of state power are ubiquitous in ordinary civil litigation too. With these delegations comes the potential for abuse. Rather
than limit private parties’ access to its delegations before any abuse has
occurred, civil procedure primarily relies on a wide array of doctrines to
police the delegations for abuse after the fact.13 These delegation-policing
doctrines enable the state to withhold or withdraw its support from exercises of delegated power that offend especially important public values.
In revealing the extent of the delegations in ordinary civil litigation and
examining civil procedure’s strategies for policing them, this Article
develops a novel theoretical account of civil procedure. It then uses that
account to show how we might adapt civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines for arbitration. Civil procedure, this Article suggests,
already contains the necessary conceptual and normative resources to
address many of the problems with the current arbitration regime.
The claim that ordinary civil litigation pervasively delegates state
power conﬂicts with commonly held impressions of our civil justice system.14 In fact, civil litigation is a public institution administered largely by
private parties. It is public, of course, in that it proceeds under the
auspices of state bodies (that is, courts), subject to the ultimate decisionmaking authority of state officials (that is, judges). At the same time,
however, our civil justice system delegates signiﬁcant coercive power to
private parties. Private parties decide whether to hale others into court;
they determine which documents to demand and whom to depose
during discovery; and they often end up rendering binding dispositions
of ongoing lawsuits by deciding whether to settle a case and on what
terms.15 Many times judges lack formal authority to preempt parties’
decisions on these matters. Even when judges do have such authority,
their hands often remain tied, at least initially, as a practical matter.16 In
many other legal systems, state officials closely control the investigation
and prosecution of civil cases.17 So too in our own criminal justice system,

12. See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
13. Much obviously turns on the meaning of the terms “police” and “abuse.” This
Article elaborates on both at infra Part II.
14. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 Vand.
L. Rev. 285, 323 (2016) [hereinafter Clopton, Redundant] (“Courts actively supervise
litigants and attorneys . . . .”); Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2014) (asserting that the circumstances in which litigants can act
free from judicial oversight are “relatively rare and quite narrow”).
15. See infra section I.B.
16. See infra section I.B.
17. On the greater involvement of state officials at all stages of civil litigation in civil
law systems, see generally Mirjan R. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A
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the investigatory and prosecutorial functions are largely the province of
state police officers and prosecutors. One of the hallmarks of our civil
justice system, by contrast, is that it assigns these and other powers to
private parties rather than state officials.18
As public law scholars have recognized, delegating state power to
private parties creates a risk that the power will be abused.19 The same
risk exists in civil litigation, though the abuse assumes a different form in
civil procedure than it does in the public law contexts on which scholars
have primarily focused. While civil procedure generally abides a signiﬁcant amount of abuse in the name of “litigant autonomy” and other competing values, it sometimes deems an exercise of delegated power too
objectionable to tolerate. This Article shows that numerous procedural
doctrines traditionally regarded as unrelated to one another actually perform the same general function of policing civil procedure’s delegations
for the most egregious forms of abuse.
Those doctrines perform this policing function using several different strategies, which can be arrayed along a spectrum according to how
much they interfere with private parties’ exercise of delegated power. At
one extreme, some doctrines rescind the delegation, putting state power
back in the hands of state officials. Examples of this strategy include the
appointment of special masters to oversee discovery, the direct involvement of judges in settlement negotiations, and sua sponte dismissals.
Other, subject-matter-speciﬁc examples include the right of the federal
government to intervene in qui tam actions under the False Claims Act.20
At the other extreme, some doctrines punish only especially egregious
abuses of delegated power after they have already occurred—either in
Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (1986); Kuo-Chang Huang, Introducing
Discovery into Civil Law 37–103 (2003).
18. While other scholars have not completely ignored civil procedure’s various delegations, they have tended to view the delegations in isolation from one another rather
than as manifestations of a single phenomenon. For example, Richard Nagareda depicted
the power of class counsel to negotiate class action settlements as a delegation of
lawmaking power without analyzing the problem of delegation in civil procedure more
generally. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the
Class Action, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 191–98 (2003). More recently, Seth Davis has argued
that, in certain cases, standing doctrine delegates to private parties the power to “enforce
the law.” See Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev.
585, 600–07 (2015). But in contrast to this Article, Davis denies that the delegation
extends to ordinary private lawsuits and does not consider other state powers that civil
procedure delegates to private parties. See id. Davis’s argument is discussed further below.
See infra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. Along with comparativists and legal
historians such as John Langbein, Stephen Yeazell has probably come the closest to
offering a systematic account of the private exercise of power in civil litigation, though not
the kind of theoretical framework developed in this Article. Yeazell’s work is discussed
throughout Part I, infra.
19. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
20. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
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the course of the litigation itself, as in the case of Rule 11 and discovery
sanctions, or in collateral proceedings, as in the case of tort actions for
malicious prosecution and abuse of process. In between are doctrines
that leave the delegations intact but allow courts to withhold enforcement
from speciﬁc exercises of delegated power that contravene public values.
The foremost examples of this strategy are courts’ discretionary decisions
refusing to compel discovery and quashing subpoenas, the constitutional
ban on race-based peremptory challenges to prospective jurors in civil
cases (so-called civil Batson),21 and the line of procedural due process
cases addressing State prejudgment attachment proceedings.22
This Article’s ﬁrst contribution, then, is to theorize civil procedure’s
response to the problem of delegated state power in ordinary civil litigation. A second contribution is to explicate the normative logic underlying civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines. According to that
logic, the delegation-policing doctrines perform a function that this
Article calls “complicity avoidance.” The basic idea, immanent in the civil
Batson case and other case law, is that when a private party abuses
delegated state power, she thereby renders the state complicit in her
wrongdoing; civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines allow the
state to avoid this complicity by disavowing a particular exercise of delegated power that offends public values. The logic of complicity avoidance
is rooted in liberal political theory, which undergirds the American
constitutional order and its criteria for deﬁning the legitimate exercise of
political power.23 Most versions of liberalism hold that the state’s coercive
power is collectively authorized by the members of the political community and exercised in their name. This creates the imperative for the
state, acting on behalf of the political community, to repudiate objectionable exercises of delegated power by private parties during civil litigation.

21. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
22. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
23. This invocation of liberal political theory is orthogonal to the enduring debate
over whether the U.S. Constitution’s ideological underpinnings are “liberal” or
“republican.” See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Liberality, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1215, 1217–24 (2000)
(reviewing the debate); Suzanna Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming
Constitutional Revolution, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1452, 1458 n.21 (2015) (collecting sources on
both sides of the debate). The answer is almost certainly “both.” See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,
Which Republican Constitution?, 32 Const. Comment. 31, 35 (2017) (reviewing Randy E.
Barnett, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the
People (2016)) (“The American constitutional tradition, understood in its best sense, has
always drawn on elements of both the republican and liberal traditions . . . .”). Indeed,
many scholars have argued that the American varieties of liberalism and republicanism are
largely reconcilable. See, e.g., 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 29–32
(1991) (defending “liberal republicanism”). In any event, the speciﬁc element of liberal
political theory on which this Article focuses—its account of political power—is sufficiently
ecumenical to accord with a wide range of constitutional theories. For further discussion,
see infra section III.D.1.
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On this account, liberal political theory provides a strong justiﬁcation for
the current shape of our civil justice system.
The theory of complicity avoidance also connects civil procedure’s
delegation-policing doctrines to other, substantive legal doctrines that
are similarly concerned with ensuring that public power does not end up
facilitating objectionable private projects. The two foremost examples of
the latter are Shelley v. Kraemer, which applied constitutional law’s state
action doctrine to prohibit courts from enforcing racially restrictive
covenants,24 and contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, as reconceptualized by Seana Shiffrin.25 This Article thus shows civil procedure’s
delegation problem to be but one manifestation of a much more pervasive
problem that is addressed through substantive doctrines elsewhere in the
law.
In exploring civil procedure’s delegations and its various strategies
for policing them, this Article develops an analytical framework that
bears on several pressing procedural problems. But here the focus is on
the implications for perhaps the most urgent one: arbitration. One of the
Article’s main contentions is that the delegations in arbitration differ
from the delegations in ordinary civil litigation in degree rather than
kind.26 And yet, many proponents of the delegation critique advocate
policy proposals for arbitration that differ from civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines in kind rather than degree. They tend, in particular,
to seek to restrict arbitration’s delegations, insisting either that courts deem
24. 334 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1948).
25. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine,
and Accommodation, 29 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205 (2000) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Paternalism]
(defending the unconscionability doctrine as a means by which courts can refuse to
facilitate objectionable private conduct).
26. Other scholars have noted certain functional similarities between ordinary civil
litigation and arbitration but not the speciﬁc similarity analyzed in this Article. Resnik has
long criticized what she views as the encroachment of the contract-based norms of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) into ordinary civil litigation, through practices such
as court-annexed ADR. See, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2806–07,
2844–50; Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 211, 212 (1995); Resnik, Privatization, supra
note 6, at 1814; Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 622–23. This Article, by contrast,
reverses the direction of the normative migration, conceiving of ADR as an extension of
the delegations that have long been present in ordinary civil litigation.
In a similar vein, Richard Freer has recently argued that, with the demise of the
civil trial, ordinary civil litigation has increasingly come to resemble arbitration, but in the
speciﬁc sense that both now focus narrowly on the resolution of individual disputes and
fail to realize the “broader goals and values” traditionally associated with adjudication,
such as governmental transparency, democratic participation, and law generation. Richard
D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 Emory L.J.
1491, 1492 (2016). Moreover, in contrast to this Article, Freer attributes this convergence
to various historical contingencies rather than to any fundamental feature of civil
procedure, such as its delegation of many state dispute-resolution functions to private
parties. See id. at 1493.
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broad categories of arbitration clauses unenforceable, so as to channel
many more disputes into public venues,27 or that arbitrators be required
to employ court-like procedures, so as to conform to the procedural
norms of public adjudication.28 These are reasonable responses,
especially given the gross power asymmetries that produce the most
controversial arbitration clauses. Nonetheless, even if courts leave arbitration’s delegations largely intact, civil procedure’s delegation-policing
doctrines suggest an alternative approach that could render those delegations less troubling—more akin to the delegations we have come to
accept in ordinary civil litigation.
Rather than restrict access to arbitration’s delegations before any
abuse has occurred, such an approach would focus on policing exercises
of delegated power for abuse after the fact. More speciﬁcally, a delegation-policing approach would address the abuse of delegated state power
in arbitration by subjecting arbitrators’ decisions to more searching judicial scrutiny. That scrutiny could take a number of different forms,
including allowing interlocutory review of key procedural decisions by
arbitrators, more frequently granting motions to vacate (or more
frequently refusing to conﬁrm) arbitral awards that issue from proceedings marred by especially serious procedural or substantive defects, and
even sanctioning parties who seek to conﬁrm such awards. While some of
these proposals would require amending the FAA, others could be
implemented through more faithful judicial interpretations of the statute
than the Supreme Court has rendered. To be sure, even robust ex post
policing mechanisms would not solve all of the problems with arbitration;
ex ante regulation might still be necessary to address some of the very
worst abuses, such as class-arbitration bans.29 The point is that, even if
arbitration clauses continue to be enforced more often than arbitration’s
critics think legitimate, both arbitral proceedings and awards should be
subject to greater judicial scrutiny than current doctrine permits.
Although other scholars have also called for this kind of enhanced
judicial review, they typically present it as only one among many

27. See, e.g., Radin, Fine Print, supra note 8, at 166–67, 173–74, 183; Horton,
Delegation, supra note 7, at 441–43; Schwartz, Small Print, supra note 8, at 125–32; Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631, 1661–73 (2005)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration]; see also infra note 332 and accompanying
text.
28. See, e.g., Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 600 (insisting that arbitral “processes
have to look more like what courts do than not”); Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra
note 9, at 1054–100; Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 80–97; see also infra note 334
and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 341 and accompanying text. But see Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308–12 (2013) (holding that the FAA requires courts to
enforce class-arbitration waivers); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52
(2011) (holding that the FAA preempted California’s ban on class-arbitration waivers).
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indiscriminate limits on arbitration.30 What distinguishes a delegationpolicing approach is that it sees ex post judicial review as a distinct
strategy, one grounded in the same logic underlying the doctrines that
respond to civil procedure’s own delegation problem.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I makes the case for conceptualizing the exercise of various dispute-resolution functions by private
parties in ordinary civil litigation as a delegation of state power. Part II
then explains why civil procedure’s delegations need to be policed and
examines the different procedural doctrines that ﬁll that role. Those
doctrines, Part III shows, perform a complicity-avoidance function analogous to that performed by various substantive doctrines—a function that
cannot be understood in standard due process terms. Turning to the
implications for debates about arbitration, Part IV identiﬁes several ways
in which the delegations in arbitration can be policed, even if not
eliminated.
The Conclusion reﬂects on some of the Article’s methodological
implications. It contends that civil procedure scholars tend to underestimate the extent of civil procedure’s delegations and to exaggerate the
differences between arbitration and ordinary civil litigation because of
the discipline’s overreliance on the procedural due process framework,
which is concerned with the procedures of state institutions rather than
the exercise of state power by private parties. Greater attention to liberal
political theory and its account of political power can help us to
conceptualize many of the problems presented by the privatization of
civil justice and to uncover solutions latent in civil procedure doctrine
itself.
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE’S DELEGATIONS
In criticizing arbitration for “privatizing” or “outsourcing” dispute
resolution, proponents of the delegation critique assume a traditional
conception of ordinary civil litigation as being part of “a rigidly independent public legal system.”31 There are many different senses in which our
civil justice system might be considered “public.” But for purposes of the
delegation critique (and hence this Article), the most important is that
“[c]ourts are seen as . . . proceeding under a system not of their users’
personal design but fashioned by bodies of rule-makers committed to
procedural neutrality and subjected to public scrutiny.”32 Civil litigation,

30. See infra notes 335–336 and accompanying text.
31. Dodson, supra note 14, at 45; see also Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at
2806 (noting that typically, “[c]ourts are equated with public processes”).
32. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2834.
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on this view, is public insofar as it is administered by state institutions—
courts—that, in turn, proceed according to state-made rules.33
This Part aims to complicate that picture of ordinary civil litigation.
The traditional conception actually conﬂates two distinct issues. The ﬁrst
is the nature of the functions performed in the course of resolving
private disputes.34 On that issue this Article agrees with proponents of the
delegation critique—and will argue in more detail in this Part—that
binding “dispute-resolution services constitute an inherently governmental function,” and indeed “an aspect of sovereignty.”35
The second issue is who actually performs the various dispute-resolution functions involved in ordinary civil litigation. Given the scholarly
rhetoric extolling the “public” nature of our civil justice system, one
might be tempted to think that those functions are performed exclusively by state officials and institutions.36 Scholars have, however, long
recognized that civil procedure puts various powers in the hands of
private parties rather than judges.37 This Part argues that many of these
private exercises of power in ordinary civil litigation should be conceptualized as delegations of state power.
More speciﬁcally, this Part contends that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure delegate state power to private parties in the following functional sense: At various points in the litigation, the Rules enable the parties to force the court to deploy coercive power for their own purposes.
The Rules may technically interpose a state official in some of those
instances, such that the parties cannot be said to formally wield coercive
33. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 30–31 (1979) (arguing that a judge “is a public officer; paid
for by public funds; chosen not by the parties but by the public or its representatives; and
empowered by the political agencies to enforce and create society-wide norms”); Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 1048 (“Virtually all of th[e] activity [in ordinary
civil litigation] takes place in the public courthouse and is presided over by a judge with
plenary power to administer and decide the case as he or she deems appropriate.”); cf.
David Marcus, From “Cases” to “Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Stability in Civil
Procedure, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 1231, 1237 (2012) (identifying as the presumptively
“legitimate” procedural form the “ideal-type” of the “individual lawsuit,” in which “the
case proceeds before a detached, neutral judge in a courtroom open to the public”).
34. Cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 1424 (arguing that an “inquiry into the nature of the
powers exercised by private entities . . . is essential given the way that privatization not only
enhances private actors’ power over others, but provides them with forms of authority
conventionally understood to constitute government power”).
35. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 535.
36. To be sure, civil procedure scholars have criticized certain aspects of contemporary civil litigation, such as contract procedure and court-annexed ADR, as forms of
“privatization.” But they depict these features as departures from, and corruptions of,
ordinary civil litigation’s fundamentally public nature. See supra notes 10, 26.
37. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94
Geo. L.J. 683, 684 (2006) (“Civil litigation . . . has been essentially privatized . . . .”).
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power, but the official nevertheless has little or no discretion to preempt
the parties’ decisions, such that the parties effectively wield coercive power
in the ﬁrst instance.38
Section I.A brieﬂy elaborates this Article’s conception of a delegation of state power. Section I.B then examines three of the most notable
delegations in civil procedure, while section I.C considers two general
objections to conceptualizing any part of ordinary civil litigation as a delegation of state power.
A.

Deﬁning Delegation

To determine when the state delegates power to private parties, we
can use either a narrow, formal conception of a delegation or a broader,
functional one. On the formal conception, the state delegates power
when it authorizes a private party to act on its behalf with respect to
other private parties, as when the government contracts with a private
entity to administer a public beneﬁts program. This is the prevailing conception among public law scholars39—and for understandable reasons.
For one thing, “delegation” is a loaded (and, at least in public law contexts, largely pejorative) term, so it makes sense to reserve that label for
situations that are thought to raise the most serious concerns. For
another, by cabining the category of delegations, we can avoid the sweeping implication that all power held by private parties is delegated state
power, which would threaten to eliminate any distinction between state
authority and private ordering.40
The functional conception of a delegation, by contrast, does not
look for an agency relationship between the state and a private party but
38. This is different from the claim that the Federal Rules allow litigants to engage in
“rulemaking,” in the sense of selecting the procedural rules that will govern their dispute.
See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice,
90 Tex. L. Rev. 1329, 1342–52 (2012) [hereinafter Bone, Party Rulemaking]; see also
Stephen C. Yeazell, Civil Procedure 138 (7th ed. 2008) (noting that many procedural rules
are merely “default rules”); Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized
Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 127, 141–44 (2018) (cataloging the
various ways in which the Federal Rules defer to party “preference” or “agreement”). By
contrast, this Article contends that the Rules sometimes allow litigants (either formally or
effectively) to exercise the state’s coercive power, whether through “rulemaking” or
otherwise.
39. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 4, at 1456, 1462–70 (arguing that the creation of an
agency relationship is the most signiﬁcant criterion for identifying a delegation of state
power); Jed Rubenfeld, Privatization, State Action, and Title IX: Do Campus Sexual
Assault Hearings Violate Due Process? 25 n.132 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 588, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2857153 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(considering state action “cases in which government uses private parties for its own
ends—i.e., when it delegates powers to private parties but continues to direct their
objectives”).
40. See Metzger, supra note 4, at 1462 & n.326; see also infra note 47 (discussing the
realist critique of the public–private distinction).
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rather focuses on who controls the application of coercive power as a
practical matter, regardless of who holds it as a formal matter. On this
view, a private party is delegated state power when she can prompt a state
official or institution to coerce another private party without the official’s
or institution’s ﬁrst having an opportunity to assess the grounds on which
the coercion is being exercised. Although the coercive power may formally be vested with the state rather than the private party, the private
party alone determines its initial application, and so effectively holds the
power in the ﬁrst instance.
While we should appreciate the risks associated with expanding the
notion of a delegation, it is nevertheless useful to conceptualize such privately initiated exercises of coercion as delegations of state power. Only
by doing so can we make sense of the delegation critique of arbitration,
which presupposes the broader conception of a delegation. As we shall
see, the current arbitration regime does not formally authorize private
parties’ chosen arbitrators to reach binding resolutions of private
disputes; rather, it effectively renders arbitrators’ decisions binding by
requiring courts to enforce them without any meaningful review.41 Arbitration thus delegates (or “privatizes”) state power only in the functional
sense.
The functional delegations, moreover, raise the same normative concerns as the formal ones. State power is distinguished by its coerciveness,42 but the state can enable private parties to exercise coercion other
than by formally making them its agents. That is perhaps no more true
than in civil procedure. What makes the various dispute-resolution
powers involved in civil litigation “inherently governmental” or
“aspect[s] of sovereignty”43 is the fact that they are binding—immediately
backed by coercion.44 As Part III explains more fully, liberal political
theory has traditionally conceived of the state as possessing a monopoly
on the legitimate use of coercion. And indeed, the next section shows
that the coercive dispute-resolution powers in civil litigation are the kinds
of powers that have traditionally been exercised by the state and that
41. See infra section IV.A.1.
42. See infra section III.D.1; see also, e.g., David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of
Governmental Power, 61 Ind. L.J. 647, 647–48 (1986) (identifying “governmental” powers
in terms of the exercise of coercion). But cf. Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State
Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1767, 1785 (2010) (distinguishing state
action according to “the presence or absence of a decisive choice by a private person,”
rather than the presence or absence of coercion). Without wading into longstanding
philosophical debates about the nature of coercion, this Article accepts that state power is
coercive in the sense that the state “typically backs its commands and prohibitions with the
credible threat of brute force or other sanctions in the event of noncompliance.”
Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law 5 (2015).
43. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 535.
44. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) (recognizing “the State’s
monopoly over techniques for binding conﬂict resolution”).
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continue to be exercised by the state in other contexts. Yet the next
section also identiﬁes a number of signiﬁcant points in civil litigation at
which private parties initially determine the application of coercive
power. These privately initiated exercises of coercion test the limits of the
traditional liberal conception of the state just as much as formal
conferrals of authority to act on the state’s behalf do, and thus equally
merit the “delegation” label.45
Some might worry that the functional conception of a delegation
proves too much, implying that all de facto power held by one private
party over another is delegated state power. While that might follow if the
state delegated power simply by enforcing, or giving effect to, private
parties’ choices, the functional conception of a delegation requires something more. When the state makes itself available to coercively enforce
certain private choices, it generally retains broad discretion to set the
terms on which it will provide that support; think, for instance, of the
intricate legal regime governing the enforcement of private contracts.46
The examples considered in this Article go much further: As the next
section shows, the Federal Rules often effectively require courts to exercise coercive power at private parties’ behest, denying them any meaningful discretion to withhold that coercion, at least as an initial matter. One
can recognize those instances as delegations without having to maintain
that the state delegates power whenever it supports private ordering.47
45. By contrast, even on this functional account, extralegal, custom-based regimes of
dispute resolution do not involve a delegation of state power. See generally, e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1994) (using disputes
between cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, to demonstrate how neighbors often
rely on social norms, rather than the formal legal system, to resolve disputes); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992) (explaining how the diamond industry has
established its own dispute-resolution system independent of any state-run legal system).
46. Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?, in Private Law
and the Rule of Law 288, 300 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014) [hereinafter
Radin, Threat] (arguing that the state’s coercive “[e]nforcement of exchanges by private
ordering” is legitimated by a “background legal infrastructure” that leaves the state with
signiﬁcant discretion to scrutinize the voluntariness and substance of private agreements).
47. Thus, even as this Article seeks to broaden the notion of a delegation, it still
maintains a distinction between “public” and “private”—a distinction legal realists have
famously dismissed as illusory. For prominent contemporary versions of that criticism, see
Louis Michael Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief: Contemporary
Constitutional Issues 61–67 (1996) (arguing that, given the conceptual confusion
surrounding the public–private distinction, “the state action analysis ought to be
abandoned altogether”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 351–53 (1993)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Partial Constitution] (discussing the state’s role in setting the legal
baselines against which private ordering occurs). Notwithstanding the force of the realist
critique, the public–private distinction remains an enduring feature of legal practice and
scholarship and indeed a “foundational premise of our constitutional order.” Metzger,
supra note 4, at 1369–70; see also, e.g., Radin, Fine Print, supra note 8, at 36 (“[O]ur
society’s underlying commitment to the idea of private ordering, which is embedded in
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Delegated Procedural Powers

This section contends that three of the most signiﬁcant aspects of
ordinary civil litigation today—prosecution, discovery, and settlement—
involve delegations of state power. At each of those stages, the Federal
Rules effectively allow private parties to exercise coercive powers over
others without prior judicial approval. There is a tendency, moreover, to
deem those same powers “public” when exercised by state officials in
other contexts; they remain public when exercised by private parties in
the course of ordinary civil litigation.
1. Prosecution. — From the very outset of a lawsuit, the Federal Rules
vest private parties with signiﬁcant power. Rather than charge state officials with prosecuting civil claims or require victims to vet their claims
with state institutions before ﬁling suit, the Rules generally authorize
“aggrieved victims of wrongs to enlist the adjudicative machinery of the
state in seeking redress.”48 Civil procedure scholars have, for the most
part, failed to closely analyze the nature of the civil prosecutorial power,49
but it has garnered more attention from proponents of the “civil
recourse” theory of tort law. One of civil recourse theory’s main claims is
that “[t]ort law . . . is about empowering private parties to initiate proceedings designed to hold tortfeasors accountable.”50 Replace “tortfeasors” with
our legal infrastructure of contract, unequivocally relies on the existence of a distinction
between the realms of public and private action and ordering—a public/private
distinction.”); J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
Yale L.J. 1935, 1968–69 (1995) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem
of Free Speech (1993)) (suggesting that, rather than “abolish the distinctions between
concepts like public and private,” we should “understand these boundaries as more
ﬂexible”); cf. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543,
551 (2000) (conceding that “the particular coercive power of the state . . . is undeniable”
even while endorsing the realist critique of the public–private distinction). That is perhaps
no more apparent than in the delegation critique of arbitration itself, which presupposes
fairly distinct public and private spheres and purports to distinguish between public and
private exercises of state power. This Article thus assumes the distinction’s validity.
48. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 37, at 687. There are a number of notable
exceptions to this general rule for certain kinds of claims. See David Freeman Engstrom,
Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 Yale L.J. 616, 644–55 (2013) [hereinafter
Engstrom, Litigation Gatekeepers] (discussing instances in which administrative agencies
serve as “gatekeepers,” screening legal claims before potential plaintiffs may proceed to
court).
49. An important, if limited, exception is the extensive body of scholarship on the
“private enforcement” of public regulatory laws. See infra note 291 and accompanying
text.
50. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917,
946–47 (2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs]; see also Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 Geo. L.J. 695, 720–21, 735 (2003)
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse] (noting that defendants in tort suits are under no
legal obligation to pay damages until a plaintiff has brought suit and secured a verdict in
her favor). At times, Goldberg and Zipursky appear to argue that plaintiffs possess not just
a prosecutorial power to initiate a lawsuit but also a remedial power to “exact” or take
something from the wrongdoer should they prevail on their claims. See, e.g., Goldberg &
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“wrongdoers,” and this claim actually describes a power enjoyed by all
potential civil plaintiffs, not just tort plaintiffs.51 More precisely, Ori
Herstein, a sympathetic critic of civil recourse theory, has explained that
a civil plaintiff’s ability to initiate a lawsuit includes both (1) a
Hohfeldian power to subject another private party to the judicial process
and to the courts’ authority to alter the parties’ legal rights and (2) a
Hohfeldian privilege to decide whether to exercise that power.52 That
combination means that private parties, rather than state officials,
generally get to decide who will be subject to the courts’ authority to
adjudicate civil claims.
The power to initiate a lawsuit, while signiﬁcant, is not in itself coercive. But the Rules go a step further, backing that power with an additional, coercive power. Rule 4 provides: “On or after ﬁling the complaint,
the plaintiff may present a summons to the clerk for signature and seal. If
the summons is properly completed, the clerk must sign, seal, and issue it
to the plaintiff for service on the defendant.”53 This effectively grants
plaintiffs the power not only to initiate the judicial process but also to
hale their opponents into court. To be sure, given the role of the court
clerk in issuing the summons, the latter power technically amounts to a
Hohfeldian claim right on the part of the plaintiff to have the state exercise its power to hale people into court.54 But that claim right is essentially absolute, for the clerk has no discretion to withhold the summons

Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra, at 919; Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra, at 718–19. The
latter would arguably constitute another signiﬁcant delegation of state power, but the
claim is controversial, and this Article does not pursue it as an example of delegation in
ordinary civil litigation.
51. See Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs 271–72 (2016) [hereinafter Ripstein, Private
Wrongs]; John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 43, 47 (2011); Scott
Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 67, 102 n.105
(2010); Ori J. Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers, 65 U. Toronto L.J. 99, 109 (2015)
[hereinafter Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers]; Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of
Respect over Repair, 18 Legal Theory 293, 312 (2012). Indeed, civil recourse theorists
have basically conceded the point, see, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Civil Recourse Revisited, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 341, 348–54 (2011); Zipursky, Civil Recourse,
supra note 50, at 734, and some scholars have attempted to extend civil recourse theory
beyond tort law, see, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse
Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 529, 531–34 (2010) (developing a civil
recourse account of contract law).
52. Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers, supra note 51, at 104, 109; see also Zipursky,
Civil Recourse, supra note 50, at 741 (“A right of action is a privilege and a power . . . .”).
See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (distinguishing between various
juridical relations, including privileges and powers).
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) (emphasis added).
54. Cf. Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers, supra note 51, at 121 (“[Tort] victims hold
a claim against the court to exercise its own legal power over tortfeasors in accordance
with the victims’ rights for redress.”).
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so long as the plaintiff’s complaint satisﬁes the necessary formalities.55 In
substance, then, if not in form, the Federal Rules assign the power to
hale others into court to private parties rather than state officials.
That power is coercive.56 Once the summons issues and the plaintiff
properly attempts to serve it on the defendant, the defendant must enter
an appearance in the action, on pain of default.57 The Rules thus
empower a plaintiff to order other parties to appear in court and then to
compel the court to coercively enforce that order—all virtually on the
plaintiff’s own say-so.58 The effects of that coercion for the defendant can
be signiﬁcant, including the expense of hiring a lawyer and exposure to
public scrutiny, as well as more formal legal consequences such as prejudgment attachment of property.59 On the other hand, the coercion
may be relatively ephemeral; a spurious complaint can be dismissed fairly
quickly,60 and even a default or default judgment can, in certain circumstances, be set aside.61 The point is that the named defendant must
generally appear before the court to get the complaint dismissed or the
default or default judgment set aside, a burden imposed by the unilateral, unsupervised actions of the plaintiff.62
A number of considerations conﬁrm that the coercive power to hale
others into court is a delegated state power. For one, we tend to associate
the power to compel individuals to appear before state bodies with the
state itself. That association is partly a product of history. Throughout
much of the nineteenth century, American courts had discretion to
review the substance of a plaintiff’s pleadings before issuing a summons.63 One ﬁnds formal vestiges of this history in the Federal Rules:
Though instigated at the plaintiff’s sole discretion, a summons issues in
the name of the court. It is formally the court, not the plaintiff, that
55. See 4A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1084, at 614
& n.5 (4th ed. 2015). Rather than require a clerk’s signature, some States even allow a
plaintiff’s lawyer to sign the summons. See id. at 614–15 & n.6.
56. See Barbara Allen Babcock et al., Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems 104 (4th
ed. 2009) (“[B]ehind that innocent-looking piece of paper titled ‘Summons’ stands the
full coercive power of the State.”).
57. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
58. The unilateral nature of this power has led at least one scholar to argue, on
various doctrinal grounds, that Rule 4 is unconstitutional. See E. Donald Elliott, Twombly
in Context: Why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) Is Unconstitutional, 64 Fla. L. Rev.
895, 911–57 (2012).
59. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.
60. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.
61. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
62. The liberal rules of permissive joinder and third-party impleader only augment
the plaintiff’s prosecutorial power, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, 18, 20—especially considering
how much latitude plaintiffs enjoy in deciding whom to join, see Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631, 654
[hereinafter Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences].
63. See Elliott, supra note 58, at 914–21.
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orders the defendant to appear.64 And it is formally the court, not the
plaintiff, that coercively enforces that order with a default judgment.65
The Rules thus formally profess state authorship over the very same powers that they functionally put in the hands of private parties, one of the
hallmarks of a delegation of state power.
For another, most agree on the public nature of the criminal prosecutorial power—the power to decide who must answer for alleged
criminal conduct and to compel those individuals to appear in court.66
While the criminal prosecutorial power may have more signiﬁcant consequences for defendants than the civil prosecutorial power,67 both ultimately reduce to the power to coercively hale people into court to answer
for alleged wrongdoing.
One might resist this analogy on the ground that civil litigation typically redresses private wrongs, as opposed to the public wrongs redressed
through the criminal law and certain regulatory-style civil actions. More
speciﬁcally, even conceding that the state delegates power when it authorizes private parties to bring criminal prosecutions, as well as certain civil
enforcement actions, in its stead, one might still deny that any delegation
extends to ordinary lawsuits seeking to vindicate private law rights, such
as tort and contract actions. Seth Davis’s “state action” theory of standing
doctrine is a sophisticated example of this position. According to Davis,
“[s]tanding involves a government power when it authorizes a litigant to
act on a government’s behalf to vindicate a government interest.”68
“Standing does not,” by contrast, “delegate the public power to enforce
64. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(F)–(G) (requiring that a summons “be signed by the
clerk” and “bear the court’s seal”).
65. Speciﬁcally, when the defendant fails to appear and the plaintiff seeks to recover
“a sum certain,” the court clerk “must” enter a default judgment if the plaintiff so requests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (emphasis added). By contrast, when the plaintiff seeks an amount
that is not certain, or when the defendant appears after having failed to answer the
complaint, the court has broader discretion to decide whether to enter a default
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
66. To be sure, private parties prosecuted criminal actions throughout most of
English history. See John H. Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner & Bruce P. Smith, History of
the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions 29–35, 578–89
(2009). And while the United States introduced public prosecutors early in its history, the
practice of private prosecution persisted in certain quarters well into the nineteenth
century. See id. at 746–49. But for at least a century, the prevailing view has been that
criminal prosecution is exclusively a state function. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of
the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 411, 413 (2009)
(“Most observers reasonably view criminal prosecution as a function to be performed
exclusively by the state.”).
67. Most notably, criminal prosecution exposes defendants to potential criminal
punishment, whereas civil prosecution exposes defendants only to potential civil remedies.
68. Davis, supra note 18, at 590; cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 1456 (“[T]he central
criterion for singling out particular private delegations for enhanced scrutiny is whether
they authorize private entities to act on the government’s behalf, a factor usually
established by assessing whether the requirements of agency are met.”).
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the law where it satisﬁes the government’s obligation to provide remedies
to redress personal wrongs and to keep government accountable, even if
the litigant’s action would vindicate a public right.”69
It is important to emphasize that Davis focuses on only one aspect of
the civil prosecutorial power. In using the term “standing,” Davis is referring simply to the right of a speciﬁc plaintiff to bring a speciﬁc claim
against a speciﬁc defendant.70 The notion of governmental authorization
does indeed offer a plausible test for determining when the exercise of
that right involves a delegation of state power.
But as we have seen, the right to initiate a lawsuit does not exhaust
the civil prosecutorial power in the American civil justice system; the
Federal Rules also effectively grant plaintiffs the power to hale defendants into court, on pain of default. This power, which Davis does not separately consider, is equally present even in cases Davis deems “private,” in
which private parties are not authorized to vindicate a governmental
interest. One need not maintain that “private standing and government
standing are synonymous”71 or “give[] short shrift to [standing’s] role in
realizing rights to remedies”72 to recognize that all civil cases involve this
limited (though still signiﬁcant) delegation, even if a narrower subset of
civil cases involve an additional delegation of the power to enforce the law
on the government’s behalf.
Davis appears to want to cabin the delegation involved in the civil
prosecutorial power because he believes that any delegation of state
power entails a duty on the part of the private party exercising the delegated power to subordinate her own private interests to public values.73
Such a duty, Davis suggests, would be inappropriate in ordinary private
law cases, in which plaintiffs should have wide latitude to pursue their
own interests in seeking a remedy, without regard to public values.74
Davis purports to derive this limitation from civil recourse theory,75 yet
civil recourse theorists themselves use the language of delegation to

69. Davis, supra note 18, at 591. But cf. Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public
Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. 8 (2010) (“The standing statutorily conferred
on private actors to enforce public regulatory laws in court effectively licenses them to
wield the coercive instruments of state power.”).
70. See Davis, supra note 18, at 595.
71. Id. at 601.
72. Id. at 604.
73. See id. at 601–04.
74. See id.; cf. BeVier & Harrison, supra note 42, at 1785 (premising constitutional
law’s state action requirement “on the thesis that private individuals are principals,
entitled to act to pursue their own interests, whereas government decisionmakers are
agents, whose function is to further the interests of the citizens”).
75. See Davis, supra note 18, at 601–04.
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describe the civil prosecutorial power.76 More to the point, as the next
Part shows, civil procedure already requires plaintiffs to restrain their use
of the civil prosecutorial power for the sake of certain public values, even
when they are not authorized to act on the government’s behalf but are
instead permitted to pursue their own interests. Unsurprisingly, these
restrictions are signiﬁcantly less demanding than the restrictions Davis
would impose on plaintiffs standing in for the government as law
enforcer; after all, the power to enforce the law is typically an even more
solemn state power than the power to coercively hale people into court.
But while the latter delegation may be less signiﬁcant than the former, it
remains a delegation nonetheless.
2. Discovery. — The Federal Rules do not cease delegating state
power once the plaintiff has summoned the defendant to appear in
court. On the contrary, the state continues to delegate signiﬁcant coercive power to both parties throughout the most consequential stage of
civil litigation: discovery. Civil procedure scholars have long recognized
that discovery is carried out primarily by the parties and their lawyers
rather than the court;77 it makes sense to conceptualize this feature of
civil litigation, too, as a delegation of state power.
The structure of that delegation mirrors the structure of the delegation involved in the civil prosecutorial power. Just as the Rules grant
plaintiffs the power to order defendants to appear in court, so they grant
both parties the power to order each other, as well as nonparties, to
disclose information. As the Supreme Court observed less than a decade
after the promulgation of the Rules, “[e]ither party may compel the
other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.”78 What was
then true only functionally became true formally in 1970, when Rule 34
was amended to eliminate the (oft-ignored) requirement of a court
order for discovery requests; the amendment authorized a party to
directly request from the other party any document or object within the
scope of discovery speciﬁed in Rule 26.79 One party can also demand that
the other answer up to twenty-ﬁve interrogatories without a court order.80
A party’s discovery powers extend over not only the other party but
76. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts and the Rule of Law, in Private Law and the
Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 139, 148 (referring to “the power the state affords to private
individual litigants” (emphasis added)).
77. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 286, 353 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Simplified Pleading]; Yeazell, Misunderstood
Consequences, supra note 62, at 651.
78. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
79. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). As the Advisory Committee explained, the point of the
amendment was to have Rule 34 “operate extrajudicially, rather than by court order.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
80. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
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nonparties as well. Under Rule 45, a party can subpoena a nonparty to
produce any discoverable documents or objects in her possession.81 A
party can also subpoena “any person” (including the other party) to
“compel[]” her attendance at a deposition.82 A subpoena technically
issues in the name of the court but is drafted by the party or her lawyer
and is signed either by the lawyer or the court clerk, who must leave the
subpoena “otherwise in blank.”83 At a deposition, a party can compel the
deponent to answer any question that does not require the disclosure of
privileged information, notwithstanding any objections (which are
merely “noted on the record”).84 Time and time again, the Federal Rules
allow the parties to order others to disclose information without prior
judicial approval.85
As with the civil prosecutorial power, the Rules back the parties’ discovery powers with the coercive power of the state—and once again leave
courts with little control over how that power is wielded in the ﬁrst
instance. If one party refuses to comply with another party’s discovery
request, the party who made the request can move for a court order compelling disclosure on pain of sanctions.86 This forces the resistant party to
either oppose the motion or turn over the requested information; she
cannot simply sit back and ignore the other party’s demands, lest she be
sanctioned for noncompliance. The parties enjoy even more direct control over the state’s coercive power with respect to discovery involving
nonparties. A subpoena issued by a party under Rule 45 (whether signed
by the party’s lawyer or the clerk) is treated as an order of the court,87
with noncompliance punishable as contempt.88 Although a nonparty can
move to quash a subpoena,89 she must take that affirmative step or
81. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c) (“As provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to
produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.”).
82. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1) (oral examination); Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(1) (written questions); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1). A party must seek the court’s permission to conduct more than ten depositions (unless the parties stipulate to more). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(a)(2)(A)(i).
83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3).
84. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). Although a deposition must technically be taken before
an “officer,” that person is usually just a stenographer or notary public who lacks authority
to rule on objections or adjudicate disputes between the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 28.
85. To be sure, at various points, the Rules encourage the parties to cooperate in
planning and conducting discovery. See Effron, supra note 38, at 138–48. But such
cooperation typically does not involve nonparties, and it occurs (if at all) in the shadow of
the coercive power that the Rules delegate to each party.
86. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)–(b).
87. 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2453, at 396 (3d ed. 2008) (“Although an attorney-issued subpoena is in a sense merely
the command of the attorney who completes the form, noncompliance with a subpoena
by the recipient is an act in deﬁance of a court order.”).
88. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(g).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3).
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otherwise face coercive sanctions simply because of the issuing party’s
unilateral actions.
We should be careful not to overstate the extent of the powers exercised by private parties during discovery. Those powers have undoubtedly
waned since 1938, as “successive amendments to the Federal Rules
ha[ve] impressed limits on the extent of discovery.”90 Rule 26, for
instance, was amended in 2015 to prohibit discovery that is not “proportional to the needs of the case.”91 Notwithstanding the increasing limits
on discovery, however, it remains the case that parties still enjoy signiﬁcant power to compel others to produce information without much
judicial involvement.92 Indeed, “from a comparative perspective [the discovery power in American civil litigation] is broader and deeper than the
powers exercised by private lawyers in any other legal system.”93 While
private parties’ discovery powers may have been curbed, they have not
been eliminated.94
But why understand these powers as delegated state powers? Perhaps
as much as any other civil procedure scholar, Stephen Yeazell has pointed
toward an answer, and his account is worth quoting at length:
Discovery empowers litigants. In a civil law system litigants
can only attempt to persuade a judge to seek information from
the parties or others. American law, on the other hand, allows
the litigants to demand information and testimony and backs
90. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1, 52 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Double Play]; see
also Miller, Simpliﬁed Pleading, supra note 77, at 353–56 (discussing changes to the
discovery rules in the late twentieth century).
91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The impact of the 2015 amendments to the discovery
rules will depend on individual judges’ willingness to employ the largely discretionary
tools they authorize. See Morris A. Ratner, Restraining Lawyers: From “Cases” to “Tasks,”
85 Fordham L. Rev. 2151, 2167 (2017) (discussing the potential impact of the amendments on judicial case management); see also Andrew S. Pollis, Busting up the Pretrial
Industry, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2097, 2115 (2017) (expressing concern that the amendments
leave judges with too much discretion over discovery). Some scholars have criticized the
amendments, and particularly the proportionality requirement, as “anti-plaintiff.” See,
e.g., Patricia Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking
Committees, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1083, 1085–86 (2015) (arguing that various amendments
to the Federal Rules over the last few decades have disadvantaged plaintiffs).
92. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1181, 1256
(2005) [hereinafter Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition] (“[D]espite the widely
recognized problems with party control of discovery, the attempts we have made to provide greater court control have been fairly limited—authorizing judges to hold scheduling
conferences and to appoint pretrial discovery masters, but leaving primary responsibility
with the parties.”).
93. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 37, at 694.
94. This Article considers the implications of increased “managerial judging” separately below. See infra section I.C.2.

This content downloaded from
147.4.185.116 on Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:51:24 UTC 12:34:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1006

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:983

those demands with legal sanctions. From such a comparative
standpoint, the power delegated to ordinary litigants by the
American discovery system is astounding. Ordinary civil litigants
receive state sanction to require documents, depose witnesses
under oath, and more. The penalties for noncompliance are
substantial, including not only consequences to a litigant within
the lawsuit, but also extending to possible imprisonment or
ﬁnes of non-party witness[es] who fail to comply. We have put in
the hands of civil litigants powers that in many legal systems
only state officials enjoy.95
To wit, in most other Western liberal democracies, judges exercise the
very same discovery powers that private parties exercise in our civil justice
system.96 There is also a long history, extending well into the nineteenth
century, of judicially conducted, inquisitorial-style discovery in American
courts of equity, a practice that formed the basis for the party-conducted
discovery authorized by the Federal Rules.97 This all suggests an
association between discovery powers and the state—an association that
still has some resonance in our civil justice system, if one is to judge from
all of the formal markers of state authority that pervade the discovery
rules, such as the fact that an “attorney acts as an officer of the court in
issuing and signing subpoenas.”98
Even within the contemporary American legal system, state officials
and institutions—most notably, police officers99 and administrative agencies100—exercise investigatory powers that are functionally indistinguishable from the discovery powers exercised by private parties in civil
litigation.101 The investigatory powers are considered public in those
95. Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law, Accessing
Law, 39 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 691, 699 (2006); see also Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 37, at
694–95 (similar). For an unfavorable comparison of the American system of lawyer-driven
discovery with civil law systems, see John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 823–24 (1985).
96. And if not judges, then administrative agencies. See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating
Discovery, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1997) (“Private litigants do in America much of what is
done in other industrial states by public officers working within an administrative
bureaucracy.”).
97. See Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 92, at 1206. On the rise and
fall of equity procedure in the United States during the nineteenth century, see generally
Amalia D. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism: The Origins of American
Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800–1877 (2017).
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
99. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 37, at 694 (“In many respects the lawyers
representing the parties in civil actions have in their hands powers remarkably like those
exercised by police investigators in criminal matters.”).
100. See Farhang, supra note 69, at 8 (“The American civil discovery process
effectively confers upon private litigants and their lawyers the same investigatory powers as
federal agencies to compel sworn testimony and to disgorge documents . . . .”).
101. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment (“The 1948
revision of Rule 45 put the attorney in a position similar to that of the administrative
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contexts not just because they are wielded by state agents but because
they function as necessary adjuncts of an unquestionably public power:
the power to enforce the law. Yet, as we have seen, private parties generally exercise the (coercive aspect of the) state’s law-enforcement power
in our civil justice system.102 Given the close relationship between
discovery powers and the power to enforce the law, it makes sense to view
the former as a state power too.103
Finally, the Federal Rules themselves implicitly underscore the public nature of the discovery powers exercised by private parties during civil
litigation. In addition to authorizing the parties to compel each other to
disclose information, the Rules establish a limited number of mandatory
“initial disclosures”—certain categories of information that the parties
must reveal to each other, independent of any request.104 This highlights
the fact that the state can choose either to directly compel the disclosure
of information itself or to grant that power to private parties. When the
state makes the latter choice, as it does for most discovery matters, it
seems difficult to describe that as anything other than a delegation of
state power.
3. Settlement. — The case for conceptualizing the settlement of an
ongoing lawsuit as a delegation of state power seems fairly straightforward. With few exceptions, the court plays virtually no role in the settlement of a civil case; the parties may “generally elect to settle disputes and
to choose their settlement terms without judicial oversight or interference.”105 Yet settlements bind the parties, and it is commonly thought
that the power to reach a binding resolution of a private dispute is a
paradigmatic state power.106
One might think that, in contrast to haling a person into court or
compelling her to disclose information, settling a case is too far removed
agency, as a public officer entitled to use the court’s contempt power to investigate facts in
dispute.”).
102. See supra section I.B.1.
103. Cf. Carrington, supra note 96, at 54 (“[D]iscovery is the American alternative to
the administrative state. We have by means of Rules 26-37, and by their analogues in state
law, privatized a great deal of our law enforcement . . . .”).
104. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Even these “required” disclosures, however, can be waived by
the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
105. Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses, supra note 6, at 429; see also Sklansky & Yeazell, supra
note 37, at 698 (“[A]n ‘active role for the trial court in approving the adequacy of a
settlement’ remains today ‘the exceptional situation, not the general rule.’” (quoting
United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1980))). The main exception
is Rule 23(e), which requires judicial approval of class action settlements. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e). Judicial approval is also required for settlements in shareholder derivative actions,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(c), and settlements reached under certain statutes, such as consent decrees in antitrust cases, see 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(e) (2012).
106. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) (recognizing “the State’s
monopoly over techniques for binding conﬂict resolution”); Davis & Hershkoff, supra
note 10, at 535.
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from state-sanctioned coercion to involve the exercise of state power.
This impression is bolstered by the default procedure for dismissing a
settled lawsuit in federal court. After the parties privately agree to settle
the case, the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action by ﬁling either a
notice of dismissal (if before the defendant’s answer or summary judgment motion) or a stipulation of dismissal signed by all the parties (if
later)—but either way, without having to obtain a court order.107 Given
this procedure, “settlements do not implicate the judiciary’s judgment”
as to either liability or remedy.108 The state in no way lends its imprimatur
to the parties’ resolution of the dispute but rather acts as if the lawsuit
had never been ﬁled. Formally, then, most settlement agreements look
like any other private contract, and unless we are willing to completely
jettison the public–private distinction,109 merely forming a voluntary
agreement does not involve the exercise of a delegated state power.110
Notwithstanding the dismissal procedure laid out in the Rules, however, courts often issue an order dismissing a settled case and incorporate
the parties’ settlement agreement into the order—without necessarily
having supervised the negotiation of the agreement or approved its
terms.111 This practice transmutes the parties’ private resolution of their
dispute into a formal court order subject to ongoing coercive enforcement by the state, while forgoing the judicial scrutiny that typically
precedes such an order. In this respect, settlements that are incorporated
into a court order are difficult to distinguish from the delegations of
state power involved in a summons or party-issued subpoena.
Even settlements that are not memorialized in a court order generally end up functioning in practice much more like formal judgments
than ordinary contracts. A prevailing plaintiff usually enforces a court
107. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A).
108. Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses, supra note 6, at 430; see also Sklansky & Yeazell, supra
note 37, at 697 (“Settlement . . . is a private, largely invisible, contractual phenomenon;
the judge plays a role only as a potential facilitator of private agreement. . . . The
overwhelming majority of settlements require only that the parties agree; the court is told
only that the plaintiff is dismissing the case.”).
109. See supra note 47.
110. Cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 1444 (“[T]he power to resolve disputes on a
nonconsensual basis, even subject to later state court review, is one that government cannot
delegate to private actors without preserving some opportunity for prior review.”
(emphasis added)).
111. One of the primary ways this occurs in federal court is under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, which held that a
federal district court may exercise “ancillary jurisdiction” over a subsequent action to
enforce a settlement agreement, notwithstanding the absence of federal question and
diversity jurisdiction, so long as it entered an order dismissing the original, settled action
while also “incorporating” or “retaining jurisdiction over” the agreement in its order. 511
U.S. 375, 381–82 (1994). For other ways in which courts blur the formal boundary
between settlements and court judgments, including through practices such as consent
decrees, see Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 628, 630–33, 637, 662–65.
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judgment against a recalcitrant defendant through separate procedures
that leave state officials with little discretion to withhold relief.112 A
violated settlement agreement, by contrast, is usually enforced through a
separate State law action for breach of contract.113 So far, court judgments and settlement agreements seem to inhabit completely different
remedial worlds. But the contract law principles that govern the
enforcement of settlement agreements can diverge from those that
govern the enforcement of ordinary contracts in crucial respects.
Compared with ordinary contracts, settlement agreements require an
especially “strong showing” of invalidity114 and are more difficult to
rescind.115 Their terms are also construed more liberally.116 And as with a
court judgment, a “court will not inquire into the merits or validity of the
original claim” when enforcing a settlement agreement.117 Some jurisdictions even go so far as to formally treat settlement agreements as court
judgments, according them the same preclusive effect.118 These and
other departures from general contract principles leave courts with
signiﬁcantly less discretion to refuse to coercively enforce settlement
agreements, versus ordinary contracts—much as state officials have little
discretion to refuse to coercively enforce court judgments. Yet in the case
of settlement, it is the parties themselves, not state officials, who have
authoritatively resolved their dispute.119
Other kinds of settlement practices grant private parties even more
direct control over the state’s coercive power. For example, under Rule
112. In federal district court, the enforcement of money judgments is generally governed by the law of the State in which the court sits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). State law
typically provides for enforcement through a combination of writ-like procedures and
separate enforcement actions. See Herstein, How Tort Law Empowers, supra note 51, at
124–30. Federal court judgments compelling speciﬁc actions are enforced via clerk-issued
writs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 70(c)–(d).
113. See J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement,
91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 59, 65 (2016).
114. 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 33 (2017); see also, e.g., Hallock v. State,
474 N.E.2d 1178, 1180–81 (N.Y. 1984) (“Stipulations of settlement are favored by the
courts and not lightly cast aside.” (citing In re Galasso, 320 N.E.2d 618, 618 (N.Y. 1974))).
115. See, e.g., Compromise & Settlement, supra note 114, § 67 (“[A] mistake that
would authorize the setting aside of an ordinary contract will not in all cases justify the
setting aside of a compromise agreement.”).
116. Id. § 34.
117. Id. § 77.
118. Id. § 27.
119. Taking this feature of settlement agreements to its logical extreme, the Supreme
Court has offered limited approval of cognovit (or confession of judgment) notes,
provisions in loan agreements that require the debtor to prospectively waive her right to
notice and a hearing before a court may enter judgment in favor of the creditor upon
default. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). Cognovit notes thus
go even further than ordinary settlement agreements, forcing the court to enter a formal,
binding judgment without any appearance by the debtor and without regard to the merits
of the case.
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68, a defendant can make an “offer of judgment” to the plaintiff.120 If the
plaintiff accepts the offer, “[t]he clerk must then enter judgment”; if the
plaintiff refuses and ends up securing a judgment no more favorable
than the spurned offer, then she is liable to the defendant for “the costs
incurred after the offer was made.”121 This constitutes a kind of contingent delegation to the defendant: Simply by making a settlement offer
during the litigation, a defendant can force the court either to enter a
binding judgment (in the event the offer is accepted) or to sanction the
plaintiff (in the event the offer is rejected and the plaintiff’s actual award
does not exceed the offer). Either way, the defendant is compelling the
court to deploy the state’s coercive power without any opportunity for
the court to evaluate the basis on which it is being deployed.122
C.

Doubting Delegation

At various points, the previous section addressed a number of
speciﬁc objections to conceiving of civil procedure’s prosecution,
discovery, and settlement powers as delegated state powers. This section
brieﬂy considers two additional, more thoroughgoing objections: (1) that
private parties are formally “subordinate” to courts and (2) that “managerial judges” oversee parties’ litigation conduct to such an extent that
none of that conduct can constitute a private exercise of delegated state
power.
1. Party Subordinance. — Even assuming that the powers discussed in
the previous section are public, one still might question whether the
Rules really allow private parties to exercise those powers in ordinary civil
litigation—whether, that is, the powers are actually delegated. Scott
Dodson’s elaboration of what he calls the “party subordinance” thesis
suggests a particularly potent challenge along these lines. According to
that thesis, “parties’ attempts to alter otherwise applicable procedures . . .
are wholly unenforceable absent some legal authorization for judicial
enforcement. And even when the law allows parties to exercise litigation
choices, courts retain largely unfettered discretion—cabined only by
law—to disregard or override those choices.”123 Dodson does not consider in any signiﬁcant detail the speciﬁc contexts addressed in the
120. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
121. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a), (d).
122. A similar account can be given of stipulations made by the parties during
litigation. As scholars have recognized, a stipulation can be understood as a partial
settlement, in the sense that it resolves some important aspect of the case but without
terminating the litigation. See Prescott & Spier, supra note 113, at 62–64. As such, a
stipulation can also be understood as a partial delegation, for it limits the grounds on
which a court can deploy the coercive power of the state but without fully determining
how that power is deployed.
123. Dodson, supra note 14, at 6–7; see also Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 562–
63 (identifying various procedural rules that require courts to override party preferences).
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previous section—prosecution, discovery, and settlement124—but his
account nonetheless suggests that, even in those contexts, we should view
courts, rather than litigants, as exercising ultimate control over the state’s
coercive power.
Dodson’s party-subordinance thesis purports to describe the formal
rules governing civil litigation,125 but it is difficult to justify this exclusively formal focus. Surely what matters is who controls the state’s coercive power as a practical matter, not who bears nominal responsibility for
its exercise.126 And as the previous section showed, the rules governing
prosecution, discovery, and settlement functionally “empower[] or
allow[] party dominance” while denying courts “discretion to override
lawful party choices” with respect to the initial exercise of coercive
power127—in contrast to the impression the party-subordinance thesis
might create.
Nor does the existence of even substantial judicial discretion necessarily preclude a delegation of state power. After all, public law scholars
conceptualize the “privatization” of various governmental programs as a
delegation of state power even though administrative agencies must
formally authorize private entities to administer the programs and retain
discretion to override their decisions, which are also often subject to judicial review.128 That is presumably because, notwithstanding the government’s supervisory authority, private parties are still exercising state
power in the ﬁrst instance and thus can potentially cause serious harm
before the government has a chance to intervene. Private parties likewise
exercise multiple state powers in the ﬁrst instance during ordinary civil
litigation. While we may think that the prospect of judicial intervention
serves as an adequate check on any potential abuse of those powers, the
risk of abuse still exists. The delegation framework developed in the
previous section calls attention to such concerns, whereas a narrow focus
on private parties’ formal “subordinance” to courts tends to occlude
them.
2. Managerial Judges. — Another objection is more practical than
conceptual. This Part has argued that parties enjoy wide latitude in
exercising various coercive powers during civil litigation, often with no
meaningful judicial involvement. But many will no doubt dispute this
124. Dodson’s only signiﬁcant discussion of discovery, for example, focuses narrowly
on Rule 29, which concerns parties’ stipulations regarding discovery procedures. See
Dodson, supra note 14, at 22.
125. See, e.g., id. at 7, 19 (emphasizing parties’ lack of “formal control over litigation”).
126. Cf. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 537–40 (arguing that delegations can be
“planned” or “de facto”).
127. Dodson, supra note 14, at 19.
128. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 4, at 1377–400; cf. Nagareda, supra note 18, at 191–
98 (arguing that Rule 23 delegates lawmaking authority to lawyers in class actions, even
though the court must ultimately approve any class settlement).
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depiction of judges as relatively passive bystanders. According to a popular critique of contemporary federal civil practice, the demise of the civil
trial has not diminished the judicial role so much as transformed it.
Rather than adjudicate cases, judges now perform a more “managerial”
function, shepherding cases and litigants through the pretrial phase.129
This judicial management takes a number of different forms, exempliﬁed for critics by the (discretionary) Rule 16 pretrial conference, during
which the judge can structure the discovery process and pretrial motions
practice.130 While judicial management does not extend to the prosecution of a case—plaintiffs still decide which claims to press and whom to
name as defendants—it has fundamentally reshaped discovery and settlement; what were once largely private, consensual processes now often
unfold under the court’s watchful eye.131 One might think, therefore,
that courts retain too much control over the state’s coercive powers
during civil litigation for those powers to be delegated to the parties.132
It is hard to quarrel with this picture of the “managerial judge” as a
descriptive matter, but it is important to distinguish two different ideas
that often go under the heading “judicial management,” each of which
has different implications for the delegation thesis advanced in the previous section. First, there is management as housekeeping—administrative
129. This critique is most prominently associated with Judith Resnik. See Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2844–50; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 496 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 374 (1982); Resnik, Privatization, supra note 6, at 1803–06;
Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 610–19; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 924, 924 (2000); see also
Freer, supra note 26, at 1508–27; Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in
the Crossﬁre, 60 Duke L.J. 669, 669 (2010); Miller, Double Play, supra note 90, at 54–61,
78–81; Miller, Simpliﬁed Pleading, supra note 77, at 292–93; Jonathan T. Molot, An Old
Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale L.J. 27, 27 (2003); Todd D. Peterson,
Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 41, 41 (1995). But see Steven Baicker-McKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial
Judges, 65 Am. U. L. Rev. 353, 353 (2015) (defending managerial judging).
130. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. Another source of judges’ management authority is the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012), which requires federal district
courts to develop procedures to combat expense and delay.
131. Indeed, one of the main criticisms of “managerial judging” is that judges can use
their managerial authority to unduly pressure parties to forgo trials and settle their cases.
See Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 638–45; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most
Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339,
1342–46 (1994) (discussing factors that inﬂuence judicial intervention in settlements).
132. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1967–71 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, Who Decides?] (describing
various forms of discretion judges enjoy under the Federal Rules, though not focusing on
the Rules considered in this Part); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the
Rules: Why State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 501, 508–10 (2016) (similar). But see Bone, Who
Decides?, supra, at 1995 n.137 (“[M]uch of what happens at the pretrial stage takes place
outside the judge’s view[].”).
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measures that help to ensure the orderly progression of the pretrial process. For discovery, judges can set schedules for making various
disclosures and raising various objections.133 As for settlement, because
judges generally have no say in the content of settlement agreements,134
they are largely relegated to encouraging the parties to settle and
facilitating negotiations between them.135 None of these forms of judicial
involvement signiﬁcantly curtails the parties’ discretion in exercising
coercive powers; the parties can still largely compel whatever discovery,
or settle on whatever terms, they would like. At least the “housekeeping”
aspect of the “managerial judges” thesis, then, is compatible with conceptualizing the parties’ discovery and settlement powers as delegations of
state power.
Second, there is management as supervision—judicial scrutiny of, and
interference with, the parties’ exercise of power during discovery and
settlement. Although judges generally do not set strict limits on the scope
of discovery,136 they sometimes do, especially in complex cases.137
Likewise, judges in some cases go beyond simply encouraging settlement
and actively participate in negotiations, even advocating speciﬁc
settlement terms.138 Again, these practices, while not uncommon, are not
the norm; notwithstanding the fact that some judges “are vigorously
presiding, sometimes as managers, sometimes as judges,” it is still the

133. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3); Ratner, supra note 91, at 2153.
134. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
135. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 37, at 701. Rule 16 expressly lists “facilitating
settlement” as one of the goals of the pretrial conference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
136. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 Minn.
L. Rev. 505, 561–71 (2000); John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary
Tale, 32 Campbell L. Rev. 455, 463 (2010).
137. See Ratner, supra note 91, at 2153–54, 2164. The court’s pretrial order may
“modify the extent of discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). Judicial limits on the
scope of discovery are by no means uncontroversial; some scholars have argued that such
limits undermine the private enforcement of public regulatory regimes. See Carrington,
supra note 96, at 60–62.
138. See Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 132, at 1968 (noting that “a judge can
choose from a diverse menu of options” regarding settlement promotion); Bert I. Huang,
Trial by Preview, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1368 (2013) (“[C]ourts . . . vary as to how much
of a role the future trial judge is allowed to play in settlement negotiations before trial.”);
Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 37, at 699 (“The civil rules cast the judge in the role—
should she wish to assume it—of participant and even persuader, convening the parties
and suggesting various possibilities of settlement and creative approaches to bridging
disagreements between the parties.”); Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note
62, at 657 (describing revisions to Rule 16 as “further encourag[ing] judges” to
“encourag[e] settlement” and noting the debate about the desirability of such a role). See
generally Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles in Settlement,
78 Ohio St. L.J. 73, 77–104 (2017) (canvassing the different ways in which judges can be
involved in settlement).
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case that “lawyers’ procedural choices will draw only sporadic judicial
scrutiny.”139
The default in ordinary civil litigation thus remains a regime of
party-driven discovery and settlement, with only the prospect of more
signiﬁcant judicial involvement lurking in the background. And even that
involvement does not eliminate the delegations described in the previous
section. Rather, as the next Part argues, we should understand “managerial judging,” in its more supervisory guises, as a set of strategies for
policing civil procedure’s delegations when private parties abuse delegated state power.
II. POLICING CIVIL PROCEDURE’S DELEGATIONS
This Part shows that civil procedure, even as it pervasively delegates
coercive state power to private parties, also contains numerous doctrines
that enable courts to police its delegations for abuse. Public law scholars
have long recognized the potential for delegations of state power to be
abused and the corresponding need for the state to police them. As
section II.A argues, civil procedure’s delegations are no less prone to
abuse, though the abuse assumes a different form in civil litigation than
in the public law contexts on which scholars have primarily focused.
Section II.B then collects and classiﬁes myriad procedural doctrines
that allow courts to police private parties’ exercises of delegated state
power during ordinary civil litigation. The doctrines fall into three main
categories: those that rescind a delegated power, those that withhold
enforcement from an exercise of delegated power, and those that punish
abuse of delegated power. Whereas other scholars have tended to treat
these various doctrines as unrelated to one another, this Part aims to
show that they perform the common function of allowing the state to
distance itself from private exercises of delegated power that offend
especially important public values.
A.

Abusing Delegated Procedural Powers

Recall the structure of civil procedure’s delegation problem: At various points during ordinary civil litigation, the Federal Rules effectively
grant private parties the power to coerce others but without requiring
prior judicial approval for those exercises of coercion. That creates a
signiﬁcant risk that the state’s coercive power will be abused—we have
learned as much from the extensive literature on the “privatization” of

139. Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 62, at 638, 647; cf. Ratner,
supra note 91, at 115 tbl.1 (identifying “[v]ariation among judges and cases” as a
signiﬁcant limit on the effectiveness of managerial judging).
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many of the government’s administrative functions.140 But just as the
delegations at issue in public law contexts differ from civil procedure’s
delegations in important respects, so we need a different conception of
abuse of state power to understand the unique risks posed by the
delegations in ordinary civil litigation.
Public law’s conception of abuse of delegated state power begins
from what Gillian Metzger has called “the principle of constitutional
accountability.”141 According to that principle, “the Constitution imposes
limits on the actions that governments can take,” limits that “apply to all
exercises of government power, whether wielded by officially public or
nominally private entities.”142 Any conception of abuse of delegated state
power in civil litigation should start from the same general principle. But
public law scholars have cashed out the notion of “accountability” in
ways that do not capture the concerns raised by civil procedure’s delegations of state power.
Consider again Seth Davis’s conception of a delegation as authorization to act on the government’s behalf.143 From that conception, Davis
derives a notion of accountability according to which “the Constitution
requires all government action to be justiﬁed by reference to some public
value.”144 A private party, on this view, must affirmatively pursue some
public-regarding purpose when exercising delegated state power for the
delegation to be legitimate; if she instead employs the power to some private end, she violates constitutional norms and abuses the delegation.145
140. See generally Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (discussing the growth of government and
the outsourcing of governmental functions to private entities); Paul R. Verkuil,
Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions Threatens
Democracy and What We Can Do About It (2007) (evaluating the role of private
contractors in performing governmental functions); Metzger, supra note 4 (analyzing the
constitutionality of the “privatization” of governmental functions); Minow, Public and
Private Partnerships, supra note 1 (considering the effects of privatization on public
values).
141. Metzger, supra note 4, at 1373.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text.
144. Davis, supra note 18, at 607 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cass R.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1692 (1984));
see also id. at 615 (“Liberal democracies demand that government action be based upon
public reasons, not raw preferences . . . .”). Other scholars take a similar view. See, e.g.,
Lawrence, supra note 42, at 659 (endorsing the principle that governmental officials
should exercise their authority to promote “some conception of what is good for the
community”).
145. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (Am. Law Inst. 1958) (providing that
an agent must “act solely for the beneﬁt of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency” (emphasis added)); Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 8.01–.06 (Am. Law Inst.
2006) (same). This constitutional principle is embodied in the private nondelegation
doctrine, which holds that the government violates due process when it delegates its
lawmaking power in ways that allow private parties to regulate others’ conduct for private
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That conception of accountability (and abuse) makes sense insofar
as the government has authorized private parties to act on its behalf. But
as we have seen, the government can delegate state power to private
parties without necessarily making them its agents or forbidding them to
pursue their own interests.146 Sometimes, the government grants private
parties power not so they can directly pursue public objectives in its stead
but so they can more effectively pursue private ends that society deems
valuable.147 These private exercises of power are nevertheless delegations
because of the nature of the power private parties wield—in the context
of civil litigation, the power to coerce others to take actions in relation to
the binding resolution of private disputes.148
This different conception of delegation calls for different conceptions of accountability and abuse. When a private party is delegated state
power but is not required to affirmatively pursue some public purpose,
she remains accountable by not offending certain norms governing the
exercise of state power in the course of pursuing her private ends. Conversely, a private party abuses delegated state power when she violates
those norms. The worry in civil procedure is not that private parties will
fail to further public goals—they generally are not required to do so—
but that they will “commandeer[] the judicial process” and “force a
publicly subsidized court to sacriﬁce public beneﬁts for purely private
interests.”149 The risk is one of harm to public values rather than neglect
of public duties.
Thus articulated, this account of abuse of civil procedure’s delegations remains largely formal rather than substantive. It identiﬁes the
purposes. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). Davis draws on the
private nondelegation doctrine in developing his state action theory of standing. See
Davis, supra note 18, at 610–11, 615–16.
146. Metzger appears to concede this point. See Metzger, supra note 4, at 1468–69
(acknowledging the possibility that the state can delegate power to private parties without
creating an agency relationship).
147. To be sure, by using delegated state power to pursue their own ends, private
parties can, through an invisible-hand-like mechanism, also further public goals—even in
traditional private law cases. Cf. William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State,
113 Am. Hist. Rev. 752, 769–71 (2008) (identifying delegation as a state-building strategy).
See generally Farhang, supra note 69 (examining how the state uses private enforcement
to augment its regulatory capacities). But the existence of such incidental effects does not
convert private parties into the government’s agents.
148. Perhaps the clearest doctrinal support for this conception of a delegation is the
“civil Batson” case. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). There,
the Supreme Court held that peremptory challenges constitute a delegation of state
power, see id. at 626–28, notwithstanding the fact that litigants may legitimately exercise
those challenges for private purposes, see id. at 626 (“Though the motive of a peremptory
challenge may be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is
to determine representation on a governmental body.”). For further discussion of
Edmonson as a delegation-policing strategy, see infra section II.B.2.
149. Dodson, supra note 14, at 15 (emphasis added).
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normative structure of the abuse as the violation of important public
values, without elaborating on the speciﬁc content of those values. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive account of
the public values whose violation constitutes an abuse of delegated state
power,150 but those values have many sources. One is the Federal Rules
themselves. The notion that the Rules are value-free151 has long since
been debunked; as scholars have recognized, the Rules embody a
number of important values, including justice, accuracy, transparency,
and efficiency.152 Beyond the Rules, substantive law reﬂects other
fundamental normative commitments of our society, such as nondiscrimination. These and other values are, to varying degrees, implicated in
private parties’ exercise of delegated state power during civil litigation.
Many procedural rules and doctrines seek to safeguard these values
by requiring courts to honor them in the course of adjudicating disputes.
Thus, courts must follow certain procedures before rendering decisions,
judges may not discriminate against parties based on race, court proceedings must generally be open to the public, and so on. But because private
parties also wield state power during civil litigation, they, too, can violate
the norms governing the exercise of that power. Hence the need for
delegation-policing doctrines—doctrines that allow the state to speciﬁcally
address exercises of delegated state power that offend especially important public values.
B.

Civil Procedure’s Delegation-Policing Doctrines

Civil procedure generally affords private parties wide leeway to exercise delegated state power during civil litigation. Rather than hold private
parties to the same standards that govern courts and other public institutions, civil procedure brooks a signiﬁcant amount of abuse of delegated
state power as one of the costs of having an adversarial, as opposed to
inquisitorial, system.153 There comes a point, however, at which civil procedure deems private parties’ abuse of delegated power too egregious to
tolerate and allows the state to counteract that abuse in various ways. This

150. I plan to develop a more complete account in future work.
151. See, e.g., Miller, Double Play, supra note 90, at 90 (noting the rulemakers’ “desire
to keep the original Federal Rules textually simple and value neutral as much as
possible”).
152. See, e.g., Miller, Simpliﬁed Pleading, supra note 77, at 288 (“When the Federal
Rules were promulgated in 1938, they embodied a justice-seeking ethos.”); Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 943–48 (1987) (arguing that the values of
“equity lived on through the Federal Rules”).
153. Cf. Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of
Adjudication and Contract, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 431, 445–48 (2010) (noting that litigants
and their lawyers may act contrary to various public values).
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section examines multiple doctrines that police the outer limits of private
parties’ discretion to wield delegated state power during civil litigation.
At the outset, it is useful to distinguish doctrines that incidentally
prevent abuse of delegated state power by limiting parties’ opportunities
to exercise it. One particularly controversial example is pleading. By
tightening the general pleading standard under Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules,154 the Supreme Court attempted to make it more difficult for complaints to survive a motion to dismiss, thereby restricting plaintiffs’ access
to discovery—and thus their opportunities to abuse their discoveryrelated powers.155 A number of subject-matter-speciﬁc rules and statutes
impose similar limits on how plaintiffs may prosecute certain kinds of
claims.156 Such doctrines do not directly regulate the grounds on which
parties may exercise the powers delegated to them during civil litigation
but rather seek to reduce the overall costs of litigation by restricting parties’ access to those powers. The doctrines nonetheless have the effect of
limiting parties’ opportunities to exercise—and thus to abuse—delegated
powers. One can therefore understand the doctrines as embodying a
kind of prophylactic strategy for reducing the risk of abuse of delegated
state power before it has occurred.
That kind of strategy has signiﬁcant shortcomings. Most notably, the
state faces considerable decision costs in trying to anticipate and forestall
every potential form of abuse of civil procedure’s delegated powers. Any
rule that seeks to restrict access to those powers will consequently be
overbroad, which can undermine other values, such as access to justice.157
154. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007).
155. This Article brackets the empirical debate over whether Twombly and Iqbal have in
fact had this effect. For a recent overview of, and contribution to, that debate, see
generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 Stan.
L. Rev. 369 (2016) (presenting empirical evidence regarding the adjudication of
defendant-ﬁled summary judgment motions after Twombly and Iqbal).
156. E.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104,
109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (imposing special procedural requirements for private actions
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (imposing a
heightened pleading requirement for fraud claims). See generally Jessica Erickson,
Heightened Procedure, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 61 (2016) (describing heightened procedural
requirements for securities class actions, medical malpractice lawsuits, and product liability
cases). State anti-SLAPP laws are another example. As exempliﬁed by California’s statute,
anti-SLAPP laws apply to lawsuits that implicate the defendant’s free-speech rights, such as
libel actions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b), (e) (2018). Defendants in such actions
may ﬁle “a special motion to strike,” which stays discovery and requires the plaintiff to
show, based on whatever evidence she already has, that she is more likely than not to
prevail on her claim. See id. § 425.16(b), (g).
157. This is a major basis for criticism of Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., A. Benjamin
Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA
L. Rev. 1710, 1732–33 (2013) (arguing that “plausibility pleading is overinclusive and
hopelessly subjective,” that it restricts litigants’ access to justice, and that it is a misguided
attempt to curb discovery abuse).
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At the same time, even overbroad rules will let some instances of abuse
slip by, putting the state in the untenable position of having to tolerate
even egregious forms of abuse.
Perhaps because of such drawbacks, civil procedure does not primarily rely on this ex ante strategy of limiting access to delegated state power.
Rather, it generally affords private parties broad access to its delegations158 and then employs an alternative, ex post strategy whereby the
state reviews a party’s exercise of delegated power for its conformity with
public values and, if the abuse is too much to bear, interferes with or
disavows the private party’s actions, making clear that her abuse of state
power cannot stand unchallenged.159 Civil procedure is replete with
doctrines that perform precisely this delegation-policing function.160

158. Cf. Richard Marcus, “American Exceptionalism” in Goals for Civil Litigation, in
Goals of Civil Justice and Civil Procedure in Contemporary Judicial Systems 123, 123, 134–
35 (Alan Uzelac ed., 2014) (arguing that American civil procedure is “exceptional” in,
among other things, “relaxing burdens on plaintiffs” and permitting “extremely broad
discovery”).
159. To be clear, civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines are enshrined in
various rules, statutes, and court decisions before they are applied in any case, and so are
in that sense “ex ante.” But they are “ex post” in the speciﬁc sense that courts apply them
in response to an abusive exercise of delegated power, whereas access-restricting doctrines,
such as pleading rules, attempt to deny private parties the opportunity to exercise
delegated power before any abuse has occurred. The ex post policing function resembles
the “anti-opportunism” or “safety-valve” function that Henry Smith has ascribed to various
equitable doctrines. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of
Opportunism 19 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2617413 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Samuel L. Bray, The
System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 530, 578–84 (2016) (describing various
“equitable constraints” that help to counteract party abuse of equitable remedies).
160. This Article’s distinction between access-restricting and delegation-policing doctrines differs from Joanna Schwartz’s distinction between “gateway” and “pathway” rules in
civil procedure. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60
UCLA L. Rev. 1652, 1654–55 (2013). According to Schwartz, “[g]ateway rules limit cost,
delay, and unjust outcomes by preventing cases from proceeding to the next stage of litigation, while pathway rules limit cost, delay, and unjust outcomes by controlling troublesome
aspects of litigation while allowing cases to proceed.” Id. at 1659. Although most
delegation-policing doctrines are pathway rules in this sense, a few terminate the litigation
and thus qualify as gateway rules. See, e.g., infra note 179 and accompanying text
(discussing sua sponte dismissals). Not all pathway rules, moreover, concern stages of the
litigation that involve the exercise of delegated state power. And even among those
pathway rules that do, some operate automatically before any abuse has occurred, whereas
the delegation-policing doctrines operate through the exercise of judicial discretion after
the fact. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (requiring the parties to make certain “initial
disclosures” “without awaiting a discovery request” or court order); Schwartz, supra, at
1659 (classifying Rule 26(a) as a pathway rule). Nor do civil procedure’s delegationpolicing doctrines constitute a form of “ad hoc procedure.” Pamela K. Bookman & David
L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 767, 772–73 (2017) (“Ad hoc procedure is
designed to address a procedural problem that arises in a pending case or litigation. It is
then applied retroactively to that pending case or litigation in order to achieve a desired
result.”). Although those doctrines operate through the exercise of case-by-case judicial
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Before this section turns to those doctrines, two caveats are in order.
First, this Article makes no claim about the origins of civil procedure’s
delegation-policing doctrines. It argues only that various procedural
doctrines currently enable courts to police civil procedure’s delegations
for abuse, whether or not they were intentionally developed for that
purpose.161
Second, to classify the doctrines considered in this section as delegation-policing doctrines is not necessarily to defend them against those
who might consider them an inadequate response to the various forms of
abuse that can occur during civil litigation. Indeed, civil procedure does
not police its delegations consistently but instead tends to address only
the most egregious forms of abuse of certain delegations, while ignoring
the abuse of other delegations altogether.162 That said, civil procedure’s
delegation-policing efforts, however imperfect, address a signiﬁcant
amount of abuse of delegated state power in ordinary civil litigation—
especially when compared with the permissiveness of the current arbitration regime.163
Civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines can be classiﬁed into
three main categories, according to how intrusively they interfere with
private parties’ exercise of delegated state power. The following typology
is not necessarily comprehensive, nor are the boundaries separating its
different categories perfectly clean. The point is to identify the most prominent types of delegation-policing strategies in civil procedure.
1. Rescinding Delegations. — The most intrusive delegation-policing
doctrines effectively rescind a delegation when it is being abused, and
then either reassign responsibility for exercising the delegated state
power at issue to a state official or, in extreme cases, deny the private
party responsible for the abuse all further access to that power. Among
the rescissory doctrines that substitute a state official for the parties are
some of the practices that civil procedure scholars have dubbed “managerial judging.”164 For example, the Federal Rules permit courts to limit

discretion, they are developed before any dispute has arisen rather than during the
litigation. See supra note 159.
161. Cf. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 415 (1996) (arguing that
various First Amendment doctrines smoke out illicit governmental purposes, regardless of
whether they were intentionally devised to perform that function).
162. For example, there is no meaningful check on abuse of Rule 68’s offer-ofjudgment procedure. See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
299–300 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of discovery).
163. See infra section IV.A.1. Civil procedure also responds to signiﬁcantly more abuse
than does public law, which generally ignores “bad faith” conduct by governmental actors.
See David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 918 (2016) (arguing
that “judges have frequently ignored constitutional bad faith”).
164. See supra section I.C.2.
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the scope of discovery beyond Rule 26’s capacious relevance standard.165
A court can, of course, exercise this discretion for many different reasons, including simply to save time and expense. But at least when a
court limits discovery in response to the parties’ abusive discovery
practices, one can understand the court’s action as (partially) rescinding
the parties’ power to decide what discovery to compel and lodging that
power back with a state official—namely, the judge.166
The effect is similar when a court appoints a special master to
oversee discovery.167 Such oversight can be quite extensive, including
supervising depositions,168 during which the Rules otherwise give the parties free rein. While courts will often appoint a discovery master for reasons of efficiency, such as handling complex technical issues involved in
electronic discovery,169 they sometimes also use special masters to curb
discovery abuse. In such cases, the court rescinds some of the coercive
discovery powers delegated by the Rules, transferring the parties’ discretion for exercising those powers to a state official.170
Courts can also effectively retract the parties’ power to reach a binding resolution of their dispute through a settlement agreement. Recall
that judges generally have no say over settlements; with few exceptions,
the parties can settle their dispute on whatever terms they’d like without
the court’s approval.171 In practice, however, some judges go beyond
merely encouraging settlement and facilitating negotiations and shape
the actual substance of a settlement agreement.172 Although the parties
formally retain control (it is the parties, after all, who decide whether to
stipulate to a dismissal), in some cases the court can exert such inﬂuence
that it assumes a kind of adjudicatory authority as a practical matter. Insofar as the court exercises that de facto authority to resist what it regards

165. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
166. The rescission is only partial because the parties still retain broad discretion to
compel discovery within the limits set by the court.
167. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (authorizing the court to appoint a special master without
the parties’ consent when there is “some exceptional condition”); Acad. of CourtAppointed Masters, Appointing Special Masters and Other Judicial Adjuncts: A Handbook
for Judges and Lawyers § 2.1, at 17–18 (2d ed. 2009) (identifying as one “exceptional
condition” warranting appointment of a master the fact that “[t]here will be unusual
discovery or evidentiary problems requiring continued oversight”).
168. See Acad. of Court-Appointed Masters, supra note 167, § 1.2, at 4 (“Sometimes a
discovery master will sit in on depositions that are particularly contentious.”).
169. See id. § 1.3, at 4.
170. Although a private individual can be appointed as a special master, she is still a
state official in the sense that she’s appointed by and accountable to the court. But see
Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 92, at 1238–60 (arguing that, in many
cases, special masters are vulnerable to capture by the parties and thus not truly
independent).
171. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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as unfair or otherwise abusive settlement terms, it partially rescinds the
parties’ power to authoritatively resolve their dispute themselves.173
Many civil procedure scholars—including many of the proponents
of the delegation critique—criticize this kind of judicial involvement in
settlement negotiations for, among other things, potentially pressuring
weaker parties to relinquish their right to their day in court.174 That is a
legitimate concern, but viewing such involvement as a delegationpolicing strategy shows it to be much less pernicious, and even salutary.
Given that most parties are going to settle with or without the court’s
approval, we should welcome judicial involvement in ordinary settlements as a way for the state to reassert control over its coercive adjudicatory power when that power stands to be abused by the private parties to
whom it has been delegated.
Beyond these transsubstantive delegation-rescinding strategies, various subject-matter-speciﬁc procedural rules can similarly be understood
as ways of reasserting state control over delegated powers, particularly the
prosecutorial power, in cases of abuse. Consider the provision of the
False Claims Act (FCA) that allows the federal government to intervene
in and take over the prosecution of a qui tam action.175 At ﬁrst glance,
that provision seems to simply reﬂect the fact that, in a qui tam action,
the federal government is the real party in interest, while the private
relator is a mere stand-in seeking to vindicate the government’s interests.
Given this structure, the FCA’s intervention provision appears to allow
the government to prosecute fraud directly in cases in which private
enforcement proves inadequate. And that is indeed the provision’s primary purpose, but not its sole one. The FCA makes clear that the government does not automatically displace the relator when it intervenes; the
173. To the extent class action settlements involve a delegation of state power, see
Nagareda, supra note 18, at 191–98, courts can similarly rescind that delegation by
aggressively exercising their authority under Rule 23(e) to review and approve such
settlements. But see, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and
Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435, 1443–46 (2006) (arguing that judges
exercise insufficient oversight of class action settlements). For critical accounts of the role
judges play in policing non-class “aggregate settlements,” see generally Howard M.
Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1015
(2013); David M. Jaros & Adam S. Zimmerman, Judging Aggregate Settlement, 94 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 545 (2017). But see Andrew Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The InformationForcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1259 (2017)
(urging judges to perform an “information-forcing” function in non-class aggregate
settlements); Linda S. Mullenix, Policing MDL Non-Class Settlements: Empowering Judges
Through the All Writs Act 1–2 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 572, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2898980 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(defending judicial involvement in non-class aggregate settlements under the All Writs
Act).
174. See supra note 131; see also Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 132, at 2012–14
(identifying other potential problems with judicial involvement in settlement negotiations).
175. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
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relator retains a (minimal) stake even after the government has intervened and taken over the action.176 The statute further recognizes that
the relator’s stake includes a degree of prosecutorial control over the
action and that the relator can abuse that control by exercising it for
improper purposes. Most notably, the statute authorizes the court to
limit, at the government’s request, the relator’s participation in the
action in various ways—not just to avoid unnecessary expense and promote efficiency but also when the relator is acting for “purposes of
harassment.”177 This suggests another (if secondary) purpose served by
government intervention in qui tam actions: reclaiming the delegated
prosecutorial power for state officials in cases of abuse.178
Each of the foregoing delegation-policing strategies rescinds the
delegated power at issue and substitutes a state official for the private
party who abused that power. But the state can also rescind a delegation
without substitution, terminating the party’s action rather than allowing
the action to continue under government supervision. For example,
federal courts may dismiss a complaint sua sponte, without waiting for
the defendant to appear and ﬁle a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12—though only when the claims are patently frivolous and only after affording the plaintiff certain procedural protections,
such as notice, an opportunity to be heard, and leave to amend her
complaint.179 A sua sponte dismissal effectively rescinds the delegated
power to coercively hale others into court, thereby preempting a plaintiff’s (perceived) abuse of that power before she has managed to inﬂict
any serious harm.
Similarly, but more controversially, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
authorizes federal courts to dismiss sua sponte an action brought by a
prisoner challenging prison conditions if the action, among other things,
“is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
176. See, e.g., id. § 3730(c)(1) (providing that the relator generally “shall have the
right to continue as a party to the action”); id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (providing that a qui tam
action cannot be dismissed at the government’s behest without ﬁrst giving the relator an
opportunity to be heard); id. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (imposing a similar hearing requirement
for settlements); id. § 3730(c)(3) (permitting the relator to proceed with the action even
if the government declines to do so).
177. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C)–(D).
178. For empirical evidence regarding Department of Justice (DOJ) intervention
practices that is potentially consistent with this hypothesis, see generally David Freeman
Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight
of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1689 (2013).
Engstrom identiﬁes the FCA’s intervention provision as an agency litigation gatekeeping
strategy that is “affirmative,” “binding,” and “retail,” with “active displacement” and
“strong control rights.” Engstrom, Litigation Gatekeepers, supra note 48, at 646 tbl.2. For
other variations on this policing strategy, see id. at 650–54.
179. See 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1357, at 409 & n.4 (3d ed. 2004).
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granted.”180 What is more, under the so-called three-strikes rule, a
prisoner generally may not be granted in forma pauperis status if, on
three or more prior occasions, he ﬁled an action or appeal that was dismissed on any of those grounds.181 Given the limited ﬁnancial resources
of most prisoners, that is typically tantamount to permanently revoking a
prisoner’s power to prosecute claims in federal court. One need not
countenance the application of this rule to prisoner litigation in particular in order to recognize it as an example of a more general strategy
that, along with other rescissory doctrines, allows the state to respond to
ongoing abuse of delegated procedural powers.
2. Withholding Enforcement. — Of course, rescinding a delegated state
power works as a delegation-policing strategy only insofar as a private
party’s abuse of that power is not yet complete. It does little good to
rescind the summonsing power after the plaintiff has haled the
defendant into court, or the subpoena power after a party has issued a
subpoena, or the settlement power after the parties have stipulated to a
dismissal. In each of those cases, one private party has already exercised
the state’s coercive power over another. So rather than seek to undo that
exercise of coercion (which is impossible), the state must try to limit its
effects. A number of doctrines aim to do exactly that by allowing the state
to avoid facilitating, or giving further effect to, an abusive exercise of
delegated power.
Unsurprisingly, this strategy does not ﬁgure prominently in the
prosecution context. Because a summons issues automatically once the
plaintiff presents it to the court clerk,182 the state cannot refuse to
enforce the plaintiff’s exercise of the summonsing power; it has little
opportunity to spare the defendant from having to appear and answer
the complaint, on pain of default. The best the state can do in most cases
is to dismiss the complaint after the defendant has appeared and thereby
deny the plaintiff access to additional state powers, particularly those
relating to discovery.183
The state can, by contrast, more effectively avoid facilitating a party’s
abuse of the various discovery powers. If a party makes an abusive discovery request and, after the other party refuses, moves to compel,184 the
court cannot undo the coercion the moving party has already exercised.
It can, however, limit the effects of that coercion by denying the motion
to compel. The opposing party still must affirmatively resist the request
and oppose the motion (or preemptively move for a protective order
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2012).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
182. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b).
183. It can also punish the plaintiff’s exercise of the prosecutorial power with
sanctions, a strategy considered below. See infra section II.B.3.
184. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
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before the motion has been ﬁled), but at least she won’t have to actually
turn over the requested information. The same is true when a court
grants a motion to quash a subpoena.185 By refusing in each case to lend
the state’s support to a party’s abusive exercise of delegated coercive
power during discovery, the court avoids compounding the abuse.186
While one ﬁnds examples of this delegation-policing strategy at the
core of the Federal Rules, it is even more prominent in other parts of the
procedure canon. Perhaps the clearest example is Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., in which the Supreme Court extended the constitutional
ban on race-based peremptory challenges in the selection of criminal
juries to civil cases187—so-called civil Batson.188 Because the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection applies only to “state action,”189 the key
issue in Edmonson was whether a private litigant (or her lawyer) could be
considered a state actor in exercising peremptory challenges against
prospective jurors. The Court applied a two-pronged test to resolve that
question and found the ﬁrst prong—whether a peremptory challenge is
“a right or privilege having its source in state authority”190—to be easily
met, given that peremptory challenges are available only insofar as the
government chooses to authorize them.191
As for the second prong—“whether a private litigant in all fairness
must be deemed a government actor in the use of peremptory challenges”—the Court considered the extent to which the peremptory
challenge is imbued with public authority.192 Peremptory challenges, the
Court noted, depend on “the overt, signiﬁcant participation of the
government,” from the government’s general administration of the jury

185. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3).
186. Similarly, even as it delegates the state’s power to reach binding resolutions of
private disputes, see supra note 111, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), at least theoretically gives
federal courts a kind of de facto review power over settlement agreements that they would
otherwise lack. For if the parties are not completely diverse and want their agreement to
be enforceable in federal court, they will have to persuade the court either to retain
jurisdiction over the agreement or to incorporate it into the order dismissing the case.
That effectively empowers the court to condition federal jurisdiction over a future
enforcement action on a fair agreement and, conversely, to refuse to lend support to an
agreement it deems unfair by refusing jurisdiction. Although proponents of the delegation
critique of arbitration have been somewhat wary of Kokkonen, see, e.g., Resnik, Contract,
supra note 6, at 627, the case creates space for a delegation-policing strategy in an area
where parties otherwise enjoy nearly unfettered discretion.
187. 500 U.S. 614, 618–28 (1991).
188. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing a constitutional ban on racebased peremptory challenges in criminal cases).
189. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
190. Id. at 620.
191. See id. at 620–21.
192. Id. at 621.
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system to the court’s involvement in voir dire.193 But more relevant for
this Article’s argument, the Court also emphasized that litigants exercise
peremptory challenges in the course of discharging “a traditional function of the government”: selecting the members of the jury, a governmental body.194 The peremptory challenge, in other words, is one aspect
of a “delegated” state power.195 And the Court clearly saw litigants as
abusing that delegation when they exercise peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory manner.
The Court’s refusal to enforce race-based peremptory challenges
can accordingly be seen as a delegation-policing strategy akin to the
strategy available to courts under the discovery rules. Like a discovery
request, a peremptory challenge ultimately depends on court enforcement to be fully effective.196 As the Court put it in Edmonson, in
exercising a peremptory challenge, a litigant “invokes the formal
authority of the court, which must discharge the prospective juror.”197
Edmonson retained the baseline rule that courts will automatically discharge a prospective juror in response to a peremptory challenge, thus
preserving the delegation of state power involved in such challenges. But
the decision also created room for courts to withhold the state’s support
from abusive exercises of that delegated power by refusing to discharge a
prospective juror in response to a race-based peremptory challenge.
Although the state cannot undo the harm inherent in a discriminatory
peremptory challenge, it can avoid facilitating that discrimination and
thereby limit the extent of a party’s abuse of delegated state power.
A similar delegation-policing strategy emerges from a series of
Supreme Court decisions over the latter third of the twentieth century
concerning the constitutionality of State prejudgment attachment and
replevin statutes. In those decisions, the Court repeatedly invalidated
laws that allowed a creditor–plaintiff to invoke state assistance in seizing
property possessed by the debtor–defendant based on the plaintiff’s
conclusory assertion of an interest in the property.198 Although the
193. Id. at 622–24.
194. Id. at 624.
195. See id. at 626–28.
196. See id. at 624 (noting that “[w]ithout the direct and indispensable participation
of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the peremptory challenge system
would serve no purpose”).
197. Id.
198. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (invalidating a Connecticut
statute that allowed a plaintiff to attach real estate owned by the defendant during a
pending lawsuit simply upon ﬁling a statement of “probable cause” and posting a bond,
without ﬁrst affording the defendant notice or an opportunity to be heard); N. Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606–07 (1975) (invalidating a Georgia
statute that allowed a plaintiff to garnish the defendant’s assets during a pending lawsuit
simply upon ﬁling a conclusory affidavit and posting a bond, without ﬁrst affording the
defendant an opportunity to be heard); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972)
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formal legal question in each case was whether the lack of an adversarial
predeprivation hearing violated procedural due process,199 the Court
could not straightforwardly apply its standard due process analysis, since
the government had not initiated the seizure. The Court instead had to
consider the permissibility of “enabling an individual to enlist the aid of
the State to deprive another of his or her property by means of the
prejudgment attachment or similar procedure.”200 This was essentially a
question of the propriety of delegating state power.
More speciﬁcally, each of the statutes invalidated by the Court
resembled the delegations considered in Part I, in that a private party
could get the state to deploy its coercive power for her own purposes
more or less on her own say-so and without meaningful judicial review. As
the Court explained in one of the decisions, “[t]he statutes . . . abdicate
effective state control over state power. Private parties, serving their own
private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods
from another.”201 This structure mirrors that of the delegations involved
in a summons or discovery subpoena.202
In all but one of the cases in which the Court found a delegation of
state power, it deemed the delegation impermissible and invalidated the
statute at issue because the State had failed to maintain adequate control

(invalidating Florida and Pennsylvania summary replevin statutes that allowed any private
party to seize personal property that she alleged to be wrongfully held by the possessor
simply upon the posting of a bond, without ﬁrst affording the possessor any notice or an
opportunity to be heard); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 341–42
(1969) (invalidating a Wisconsin garnishment statute that allowed a creditor to
temporarily freeze the wages of the debtor pending the outcome of the garnishment
action simply by serving the summons, without ﬁrst affording the debtor any notice or an
opportunity to be heard).
199. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 9; Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 603; Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80;
Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 338.
200. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 9.
201. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93.
202. To be sure, the Court later made clear that a statute does not delegate state power
simply by licensing self-help. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978)
(noting that the “total absence of overt official involvement plainly distinguishes this case
from earlier decisions imposing procedural restrictions on creditors’ remedies”); cf.
Andrew S. Gold, Private Rights and Private Wrongs, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1071, 1074–80
(2017) (arguing that the law sometimes allows self-help, and in such cases, the person
engaging in self-help is enforcing her own rights, not exercising state power). But a
subsequent decision held that there is a delegation of state power “whenever officers of
the State act jointly with a creditor in securing the property in dispute,” which is the case
“when the State has created a system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex
parte application of one party to a private dispute.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 932–33, 942 (1982) (construing the phrase “under color of state law” in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 but treating that issue as more or less synonymous with the constitutional state
action inquiry); cf. Zoë Sinel, De-Ciphering Self-Help, 67 U. Toronto L.J. 31, 58 n.70
(2017) (arguing that “replevin is not self-help”).
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over its coercive power.203 Those decisions can thus be understood as
prohibiting delegations of state power when there were insufficient checks
on how private parties exercised that power.
The Court instead pursued a delegation-policing strategy in the one
decision in which it both found state action under a repossession statute
and upheld the statute as consistent with due process. In Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., the Court sustained a Louisiana statute that allowed a creditor,
on ex parte application to a judge, to provisionally sequester personal
property held by the debtor subject to a vendor’s lien.204 The Court
distinguished its prior decisions invalidating similar statutes on multiple
grounds but emphasized in particular that the predeprivation hearing,
though ex parte, was before a judge rather than a court clerk or other
ministerial official, and that the creditor had to submit a sworn affidavit
setting out the speciﬁc factual allegations entitling her to possession of
the property.205 Notwithstanding these differences, it still makes sense to
view the Louisiana statute as delegating state power. After all, the predeprivation judicial review provided by the statute, while perhaps more than
“a mere ministerial act,”206 did not amount to that much more. “Since
the procedure . . . is completely ex parte,” Justice Stewart explained in
dissent, the judge “can do little more than determine the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations before ordering the state agents to
take the goods from the defendant’s possession.”207 The provision for
judicial review thus did not eliminate the delegation conferred by the
other parts of the statute; the baseline remained virtually automatic
enforcement of a creditor’s sequestration request. And yet, the statute
did allow the state to police that delegation to some degree, by refusing
to lend its support to patently abusive sequestration requests. That
limited opportunity for the state to withhold enforcement may well have
been insufficient to address all or even most abuse, but it is nevertheless
an example of a kind of delegation-policing strategy employed in other
parts of civil procedure.
3. Punishing Abuse. — Besides rescinding a delegation of state power
when it is being abused or withholding enforcement to limit the effects
of the abuse, the state can punish the private party who commits the
abuse with various sanctions after the fact. This delegation-policing
203. See, e.g., Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91–94.
204. 416 U.S. 600, 618–19 (1974).
205. See id. at 607–10, 616–17; see also N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601,
607 (1975) (distinguishing a Georgia garnishment statute from the statute at issue in
Mitchell on the ground that it required only a conclusory affidavit to be ﬁled with the
clerk). The Court also noted that the questions to be resolved by the judge concerned
“uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof.” Mitchell, 416 U.S. at
609.
206. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 616 n.12.
207. Id. at 629, 632 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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strategy tends to be less intrusive than the ﬁrst two, as it does not attempt
to actually interfere with private parties’ exercise of delegated state
power; parties can still exercise the delegated power as they will, though
they must suffer the consequences for any abuse they perpetrate. Nor, of
course, can sanctions undo the abuse.208 Yet they do allow the state to disavow an abusive exercise of delegated state power by expressing condemnation of the private party’s conduct.
The paradigmatic example of this delegation-policing strategy is
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules. Rule 11 authorizes courts to impose sanctions on a party or her lawyer for, among other things, “presenting” a
written submission “for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”209 To be
sure, “presenting” written submissions to the court encompasses a broad
swath of litigation conduct, including routine adversarial actions that in
no way involve an exercise of delegated state power. A party does not, for
instance, exercise delegated state power by ﬁling a motion for a preliminary injunction or for summary judgment. Filing a written submission
does, however, frequently involve an exercise of delegated state power—
most notably, when a plaintiff ﬁles a complaint and thereby triggers the
issuance of a summons.
In punishing parties for taking such actions for an “improper
purpose,” Rule 11 reﬂects the conception of abuse of delegated state
power developed in the previous section. Rule 11, like the rest of civil
procedure, grants private parties signiﬁcant latitude to use delegated
state power to pursue private ends; a private purpose is not necessarily an
“improper purpose,” and so does not necessarily render an exercise of
delegated state power abusive. At the same time, however, private parties
must observe certain public norms in wielding state power, and Rule 11
imposes liability for offending those norms. This allows the state to repudiate, if not reverse, private parties’ abusive exercises of delegated state
power.210 Especially when it’s too late to rescind the delegation or withhold enforcement, punishing abuse may be the only practical way for the

208. In very rare circumstances, civil procedure allows courts to undo an abusive
exercise of delegated state power. For example, when a party obtains a ﬁnal judgment in
her favor by fraud or other misconduct, the court may annul the judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3).
209. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
210. Among the sanctions a court may impose under Rule 11 are nonmonetary sanctions and monetary penalties payable either to the court or to the other party. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(4). When a court imposes a nonmonetary remedy or a penalty payable to the
court, the sanction is purely punitive; when it imposes a penalty payable to the other party
(such as an award of costs or attorney’s fees), the sanction is also compensatory.
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state to maintain a degree of accountability for the procedural powers it
has delegated to private parties.211
Civil procedure employs similarly punitive delegation-policing strategies throughout civil litigation. While Rule 11 expressly does not apply
to discovery,212 Rule 26 authorizes courts to sanction a party for any
discovery request that is “interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”213 And pursuant to their inherent powers, federal courts may
order a party to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees as a sanction for “badfaith” litigation conduct.214 At least where these sanctions are imposed in
connection with an exercise of delegated state power, they constitute an
important delegation-policing strategy.
The state can sanction abusive exercises of delegated state power not
only during the litigation but also through collateral proceedings. Foremost among the collateral mechanisms are the tort law causes of action
for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Like Rule 11, these torts
embody the notion of abuse developed in the previous section, in that
each imposes tort liability for litigation conduct taken for some “improper purpose” or with “malice”—instituting a lawsuit in the case of malicious prosecution and, depending on the jurisdiction, a wide range of
other procedural actions in the case of abuse of process.215 The actionable abuse, once again, consists in transgressing certain public values in
the course of exercising delegated state power rather than merely using
such power to pursue some private objective. While it is relatively difficult

211. Scholars have criticized Rule 11 on various grounds over the decades. Among
other criticisms, they have faulted courts for imposing sanctions inconsistently across
different categories of parties and have worried that the risk of sanctions deters
potential plaintiffs from bringing meritorious lawsuits. See Stephen B. Burbank, The
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1925, 1937 (1989); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11—Some
“Chilling” Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo. L.J.
1313, 1339–43 (1986); William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013,
1015–17 (1988). Rule 11 was signiﬁcantly revised in 1993, largely to address these kinds of
concerns. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 Ind. L.J. 171, 171
(1995). Interestingly, the normative valence of Rule 11 seems to have shifted in recent
years, as some scholars now invoke Rule 11 as a preferable alternative to other measures
aimed at curbing abusive litigation practices, such as heightened pleading standards. See
Spencer, supra note 157, at 1722, 1732–33.
212. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d).
213. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii), (3). Rule 45 likewise allows courts to sanction a
party for issuing and serving a subpoena that “impos[es] undue burden or expense.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1).
214. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991).
215. See 3 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 592,
at 407–15 (2d ed. 2011); id. § 594, at 418–28.
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to prevail on these causes of action,216 they attach at least some negative
consequences to abusive exercises of delegated state power, especially
when sanctions during the litigation are unavailable or prove insufficient.
To be clear, actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process are
instituted by other private parties, not state officials. So insofar as they
constitute a punitive delegation-policing strategy, that strategy is only
indirect; the delegation-policing function is itself delegated to private
parties. This shows that, in contrast to Rule 11 sanctions, the maliciousprosecution and abuse-of-process torts are primarily compensatory and
only secondarily punitive. Nevertheless, in affording victims of abusive
exercises of delegated state power some kind of remedy, the state
imposes limits on civil procedure’s various delegations.
Finally, courts can sanction lawyers as well as the parties they represent, both during the litigation and through collateral proceedings.
During the litigation, Rule 11 and Rule 26 authorize a court to sanction a
party’s lawyer instead of, or in addition to, the party herself.217 Other
provisions are directed exclusively at lawyers, such as a federal statute
allowing courts to hold a lawyer partially liable for the opposing side’s
attorney’s fees and costs when she “multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously.”218 Such conduct often involves
abusing some of the delegated state powers involved in ordinary civil
litigation.219 As for collateral mechanisms, a number of professional
ethics rules cover lawyer conduct that can constitute an abuse of
delegated state power.220 One of the subsidiary functions of the system of
lawyer discipline, it turns out, is policing some of civil procedure’s
delegations on behalf of the state. Sanctioning lawyers in all of these
various ways makes perfect sense as a delegation-policing strategy insofar
as a party has subdelegated a delegated state power to her lawyer and the
lawyer is at least partially responsible for abusing that power. As with
sanctions directed at the parties, the point is to target the individual who
actually abused delegated state power so that the state can distance itself
from her misconduct.

216. For example, in addition to having to prove that the abusive lawsuit was instituted
for an improper purpose, a malicious-prosecution plaintiff must prove that the suit was not
supported by probable cause and was terminated in her favor. See id. § 592, at 407–08. A
substantial minority of jurisdictions also require malicious-prosecution plaintiffs to show
that they suffered some kind of “special injury” from the abusive lawsuit. See id. § 593, at
415–18.
217. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1), 26(g)(1)(3).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
219. See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855 F.2d 1009, 1019–20 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that § 1927 applies to discovery abuse).
220. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct rs. 1.2(d), 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5(d) (Am. Bar
Ass’n 2016).
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III. DELEGATION POLICING AS COMPLICITY AVOIDANCE
Considering civil procedure’s various delegation-policing doctrines
raises the question why the state should police the delegated powers in
ordinary civil litigation for abuse. At ﬁrst blush, the answer seems
obvious: Especially because state power is coercive power, abuse of
delegated state power can cause signiﬁcant harm to others; the various
delegation-policing strategies help to ameliorate, if not prevent, that
harm.221 This concern is surely an important part of the story. Indeed, it
helps to explain why, from a delegation-policing perspective, many of the
doctrines discussed in the previous Part are overbroad, in that they regulate not just exercises of delegated state power but adversarial litigation
conduct more generally. Those doctrines reﬂect a generic concern with
the harms that can be inﬂicted through civil litigation, whether by abuse
of delegated state power or otherwise.
Some of the other doctrines, however, have a narrower focus,
uniquely targeting exercises of delegated state power, and then only
certain kinds of abuse of that power. This Part identiﬁes an additional
reason, beyond general harm prevention, for the state to focus on some
forms of procedural abuse to the exclusion of others. It argues that the
various delegation-policing doctrines reﬂect not only an other-regarding
concern with limiting the harm private parties can suffer from the abuse
of delegated state power, but also a self-regarding concern on the part of
the state with distancing itself from private wrongdoing that involves the
violation of certain public values, so as to preserve its own moral integrity
and that of the political community it serves. This Article labels the latter
concern “complicity avoidance.”222
As with this Article’s account of abuse of delegated state power,223 its
account of complicity avoidance is primarily formal rather than substantive. This Part seeks to elucidate the general normative structure of the
state’s role in facilitating private wrongdoing during civil litigation, not to
comprehensively catalog the types of private wrongdoing that threaten to
implicate the state and the political community or to specify all the

221. Cf. Davis, supra note 18, at 615–21 (arguing that abuse of the delegated power to
enforce the law on the government’s behalf can harm third parties in various ways);
Metzger, supra note 4, at 1462–63 (arguing that abuse of the delegated power to
administer governmental programs on the government’s behalf can unfairly deprive third
parties of access to government beneﬁts).
222. This concern differs from more familiar anxieties about procedural private
ordering’s effects on judicial “integrity” or “legitimacy”—the worry that private parties’
preferences will displace judges’ independent judgment. See Bone, Party Rulemaking,
supra note 38, at 1384–97; Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 547–51; Dodge, supra note
10, at 764–70; cf. Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses, supra note 6, at 419–25 (criticizing certain
kinds of remedial clauses in contracts on similar grounds).
223. See supra section II.A.
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circumstances in which the state has an obligation to extricate itself from
those misdeeds.
Section III.A introduces the concept of complicity avoidance, revealing its logic to be immanent in certain corners of civil procedure doctrine,
particularly civil Batson. Section III.B then shows that state complicity in
private wrongdoing is a problem that recurs throughout the law. It
considers, in particular, two instances of complicity avoidance beyond
civil procedure: the version of the state action doctrine applied in Shelley
v. Kraemer and Seana Shiffrin’s revisionist account of the unconscionability doctrine in contract law. Section III.C defends complicity avoidance
as a distinct normative logic that cannot be reduced to the dominant
normative logic in civil procedure, procedural due process. Finally,
section III.D grounds complicity avoidance in liberal political theory,
according to which the state claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of
coercive power and exercises that power in the name of the political
community. These features of political power raise the moral stakes of
delegation, threatening to implicate all of us in private wrongdoing.
A.

Complicity Avoidance in Civil Procedure

In decisions applying civil procedure’s various delegation-policing
doctrines, courts rarely discuss in signiﬁcant detail the values served by
policing delegations for abuse. But when they do, they do not focus exclusively on the harm suffered by victims of abusive exercises of delegated
state power; they also speak of the abuse’s “tainting” or “corrupting” the
civil justice system, or the wrongdoer’s making the court “a party to” the
abuse.224 Courts also worry, in other words, about the state’s becoming
complicit in the abuse.
This distinct, self-regarding concern is perhaps most explicit in
Edmonson, the civil Batson case. To be sure, the Court acknowledged the
personal “injury to excluded jurors” from discriminatory peremptory
challenges.225 But also at stake, in the Court’s view, was the state’s own
moral integrity. “By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge,”
the Court explained, a “court ‘has not only made itself a party to the
[biased act], but has elected to place its power, property and prestige
behind the [alleged] discrimination,’” and thus “in a signiﬁcant way has
involved itself with invidious discrimination.”226 This complicity in private
discrimination “mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the

224. See infra notes 237–238 and accompanying text.
225. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
226. Id. at 624 (alterations in original) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)); see also id. at 628 (“[R]acial discrimination in the qualiﬁcation
or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991))).
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idea of democratic government from becoming a reality.”227 Edmonson
essentially imposed an obligation on all courts to avoid complicity by
refusing to give effect to discriminatory peremptory challenges—that is,
by withholding state support from abusive exercises of a delegated state
power.
In her dissent in Edmonson, Justice O’Connor rejected the majority’s
broad notion of state responsibility for private wrongdoing in civil litigation. The civil trial, as she saw it, “is by design largely a stage on which
private parties may act”;228 the state merely “erects the platform” and
“does not thereby become responsible for all that occurs on it.”229 For
this alternative conception of the civil trial, Justice O’Connor relied primarily on the Court’s decision in Polk County v. Dodson, which had held
that a public defender does not act “under color of state law” within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when executing a lawyer’s traditional “adversarial functions.”230 A lawyer, the Dodson Court reasoned, performs what
is “essentially a private function”: “advancing ‘the undivided interests of
his client.’”231 The Edmonson majority acknowledged that not every act by
a party or her lawyer during civil litigation necessarily constitutes state
action.232 Nonetheless, it viewed the peremptory challenge as not just
another “private function,” but an exercise of delegated state power that
threatened to implicate the state in the grievous moral wrong of racial
discrimination.233
In fairness, Justice O’Connor had a point when she observed that
the peremptory challenge is really not so different from other “adversarial act[s]” taken during civil litigation.234 To take two examples, summonses and subpoenas seem to share the features that, in the Edmonson
Court’s view, render a peremptory challenge state action: They similarly
depend on “the overt, signiﬁcant participation of the government,”235 in
that each is issued in the name of the court and is backed by the state’s

227. Id. at 628.
228. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). But see id. at 633–34 (“The peremptory
[challenge] is, by design, an enclave of private action in a government-managed
proceeding.”).
229. Id. at 632; see also id. at 641 (maintaining that “the performance of a lawyer’s
duties in a courtroom” does not constitute state action).
230. 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981).
231. Id. at 318–19 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)).
232. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 627–68 (explaining that in most civil cases, “the initial
decision whether to sue at all, the selection of counsel, and any number of ensuing tactical
choices in the course of discovery and trial may be without the requisite governmental
character to be deemed state action”).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 642 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 622 (majority opinion).
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coercive power, and neither seems to be any less of a “traditional function of the government”236 than a peremptory challenge.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, courts employ the logic of complicity
avoidance beyond the state action context and in cases involving procedural powers other than peremptory challenges. For example, in decisions
imposing sanctions under Rule 11 and the discovery rules, courts often
describe the abuse of prosecution and discovery-related powers as “tainting” or “corrupting” the justice system or making the court “a party to”
or even “complicit in” private wrongdoing, and they invoke sanctions as
a way of removing that taint.237 Similar rhetoric appears in abuse-ofprocess and malicious-prosecution decisions.238 Whether or not the
exercise of these other procedural powers formally constitutes state
action as a matter of constitutional law, courts view the abuse of those
powers as breaching the public–private divide and staining the state’s
moral integrity.
The notion of complicity in these decisions does not depend on the
narrower conception of a delegation articulated by public law scholars
such as Davis and Metzger.239 The state can, in other words, become complicit in an abusive exercise of delegated state power even though the
private party wielding that power isn’t acting on the government’s behalf
or constrained to pursue its purposes. In Edmonson, for instance, the Court
perceived a threat of complicity, notwithstanding the fact that private parties may legitimately exercise peremptory challenges for their own ends.240
236. Id. at 624.
237. See, e.g., Xyngular Corp. v. Schenkel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1273, 1328 (D. Utah 2016)
(“Anything short of dismissal will fail to remove the taint that Schenkel has caused and fail
to adequately deter future litigants from engaging in this type of self-help discovery.”); see
also Mark v. New Orleans City, No. 15-7103, 2017 WL 2152367, at *6 (E.D. La. May 16,
2017) (acknowledging “cases where courts have . . . noted that the legitimacy of courts is
injured when courts are ‘complicit in allowing these shakedown schemes to continue’” but
ultimately declining to impose sanctions under Rule 11 (quoting Doran v. Del Taco, Inc.,
373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2005))).
238. See Cordes v. Outdoor Living Ctr., Inc., 781 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Ark. 1989) (likening
abuse of process to extortion or coercion, and noting the possibility that the process might
be “tainted by a willful act” of one of the parties); Antur Realty Corp. v. Rivera, 442
N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (Civ. Ct. 1981) (arguing that an “abuse of process” can “make th[e]
court a party to . . . a tainted cause”); Wolfe v. Little, No. 18718, 2001 WL 427408, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2001) (explaining that the abuse-of-process tort “developed to
provide a remedy in situations where an appropriate legal procedure has been . . .
corrupted in order to accomplish some ulterior motive for which a court proceeding was
not intended”); see also Kolka v. Jones, 71 N.W. 558, 565–66 (N.D. 1897) (“If the law will
not punish such conduct . . . the courts themselves will seem to have forsaken their high
function as protectors and vindicators of invaded rights, and to have become, instead, the
accomplices of evil men.”).
239. See supra notes 68–75, 143–145 and accompanying text.
240. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 626 (“Though the motive of a peremptory challenge
may be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to
determine representation on a governmental body.”).
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The risk of complicity arises not because private parties are standing in for
the state but because they are exercising its coercive powers. This means
that the state faces a pervasive risk of complicity in civil litigation. Because
a private party need not be authorized to act as the state’s agent in order
to render it complicit in her wrongdoing, every exercise of delegated state
power in civil litigation potentially implicates the state’s moral integrity.
And because there is a ﬁne line between a legitimate private purpose and
an improper one—an aggressive discovery request, for example, can
quickly shade into a vexatious one—a signiﬁcant number of those exercises of delegated power will in fact prove to be abusive, and thus, for the
state, corrupting.
And yet, civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines only
mitigate the threat of complicity rather than eliminate it. They do so to
varying degrees. The delegation-rescinding doctrines afford the state the
most protection, deeming the risk of complicity too great to allow private
parties to continue to exercise state power unsupervised by state officials.
The doctrines that withhold enforcement from certain exercises of delegated power, by contrast, are somewhat more permissive: They allow private parties to continue to exercise—and thus to abuse—delegated state
powers but refuse to lend the state’s support to exercises of those powers
that offend especially important public values. Finally, the doctrines that
punish abusive exercises of delegated state power tolerate the most
complicity, censuring only the worst forms of abuse after they have
occurred. Given the limits of the various delegation-policing strategies,
the state ends up incurring a good deal of complicity in abusive exercises
of delegated power that can be neither thwarted nor repudiated. This is
by no means to deny the signiﬁcant beneﬁts of delegating procedural
powers to private parties.241 But we should also recognize that those beneﬁts come at a considerable moral cost to the state.242
B.

Complicity Avoidance Beyond Civil Procedure

Civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines represent a distinctly
procedural response to a distinctly procedural problem. Ordinary civil
litigation delegates a number of procedural powers to private parties. In
abusing those powers, private parties can render the state complicit in
241. These beneﬁts are discussed further at infra section III.D.2.
242. In this respect, civil procedure provides private parties with a moral subsidy—not
just the ﬁnancial subsidy that other scholars have identiﬁed. See, e.g., Judith Resnik,
Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and
Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2119, 2131–37 (2000)
(identifying various taxpayer-ﬁnanced subsidies for civil litigants); Stephen J. Ware, Is
Adjudication a Public Good? “Overcrowded Courts” and the Private Sector Alternative of
Arbitration, 14 Cardozo J. Conﬂict Resol. 899, 900 (2013) (criticizing the civil justice
system for squandering “public resources that would be better spent on parties who
deserve the subsidy”). I plan to explore this idea further in future work.
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their wrongdoing. The delegation-policing doctrines, in their different
ways, allow the state to avoid that complicity by distancing itself from private parties’ exercises of delegated procedural powers.
Sometimes, however, the threat of complicity arises from the substance
of a party’s legal claims. Even when private parties exercise delegated
procedural powers scrupulously, they can still jeopardize the state’s moral
integrity if they are using civil litigation to seek the state’s support for
some objectionable goal and the substantive law entitles them to relief.
This different iteration of the complicity problem calls for different,
substantive complicity-avoidance doctrines—rules of substantive law that
alter the content of a given cause of action in a way that thwarts private
parties’ attempts to use civil litigation to achieve certain repugnant ends.
Attending to these doctrines not only reveals a deep connection between
procedure and substance but also gives a fuller sense of the kinds of private wrongdoing that trigger complicity concerns. This section considers
two substantive complicity-avoidance doctrines: the version of the state
action doctrine applied in Shelley v. Kraemer and Seana Shiffrin’s revisionist account of the unconscionability doctrine in contract law.
Shelley held that a State court’s enforcement of a racially restrictive
covenant is “state action” that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.243 While the Court relied on precedents holding that
official judicial action is state action,244 it never clearly explained how
private parties’ discriminatory motives can taint a judicial decision. The
Court’s reasoning, however, indicates that the constitutional violation in
Shelley must have amounted to state complicity in private discrimination.
The Court never suggested that either of the States involved had itself
engaged in any discriminatory conduct. Rather, the State courts had facilitated private discrimination by giving effect to discriminatory private
agreements. Their responsibility for the discrimination was therefore
secondary rather than primary. This is reﬂected in the language of the
Court’s opinion, which described the State courts’ enforcement of the
restrictive covenants as the “[p]articipation of the State” in private
discrimination.245 And while acknowledging that “the particular pattern of
discrimination . . . was deﬁned initially by the terms of a private agreement,” the Court noted that “[t]he judicial action” of enforcing that
discrimination “bears the clear and unmistakable imprimatur of the
State.”246 Such language describes the role of the accomplice, not the
principal.
The private wrongdoing that the State courts had facilitated was a
matter of the substance of the restrictive covenants, rather than anything
243.
244.
245.
246.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14–20 (1948).
See id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 20.
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the parties had done during the litigation to enforce them. The Court
accordingly had to look to substantive law to develop a strategy for
avoiding state complicity in that wrongdoing. Given that the racially
restrictive covenants were enforceable under each State’s common law of
property, the Court essentially ordered the States to revise their common
law to no longer recognize such agreements,247 thereby making the
agreements solely a matter of “voluntary adherence.”248 By refusing to
coercively enforce the racially restrictive covenants, the Court believed,
the States could extricate themselves from that private discrimination.
That is the logic of complicity avoidance.
This account by no means solves the perennial puzzle surrounding
Shelley: how to cabin its holding to prevent constitutional law from
subsuming nearly all of private law. The Supreme Court has itself balked
at Shelley’s most sweeping implications, signiﬁcantly reining in the state
action doctrine in subsequent decisions.249 But the Court and commentators alike have failed to articulate a coherent, principled basis for limiting
Shelley’s logic.250 In light of that failure, we could simply dismiss Shelley as
a (necessary and justiﬁed) realist aberration, the high-water mark of the
Court’s attempt to extend federal judicial oversight over as many discriminatory practices as possible. A less ad hoc response would be to accept
the full breadth of Shelley’s articulation of the state action doctrine and to
focus on determining when the state should refuse to lend its support to
private wrongdoing. It may be better to candidly acknowledge the extent
of the state’s potential involvement in private wrongdoing and to consider when the state has a duty to repudiate it than to occlude the moral
costs of our commitment to private ordering by simply pretending that
the state isn’t implicated.251

247. See id. at 19, 22.
248. Id. at 13.
249. See Davis, supra note 18, at 594 n.40 (explaining that Shelley was the closest the
Court has come to treating “every private action as state action” but further noting that
the Court “has never read that case for all it may be worth”).
250. See, e.g., Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 47, at 56, 73 (noting that
Shelley is “extremely controversial” and that the “puzzle of the case” lies in the fact that
“judicial enforcement of voluntary agreements is not normally thought to violate the
Constitution”); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1697 (2d ed. 1988)
(arguing that the Court’s modern state action decisions “appear peculiarly unpersuasive”
in purporting to “articulate and apply an autonomous state action doctrine”); Mark
Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in
Comparative Constitutional Law 167 (2008) (explaining that the rule established in Shelley
can be difficult to apply in other state action cases); cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967) (calling the state action doctrine “a
conceptual disaster area”).
251. Cf. Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 47, at 160 (“Shelley v. Kraemer . . .
was a remarkably easy state action case. . . . The case was difficult only because it is unclear
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Read as a complicity-avoidance decision, Shelley identiﬁes a problem
that, far from being limited to constitutional law’s state action doctrine,
recurs throughout the law. Consider the unconscionability doctrine in
contract law, as reconceptualized by Shiffrin.252 The unconscionability
doctrine allows courts to refuse to enforce an otherwise valid contract the
terms of which were manifestly unfair or immoral at the time the agreement was formed.253 Both critics254 and defenders255 of the doctrine have
viewed it as paternalistic, since it relieves one of the parties to a contract
of her freely assumed obligations when they prove to have been unwise.
Against this consensus, Shiffrin contends that the unconscionability doctrine need not be paternalistic, depending on the state’s motive in deploying it. Insofar as the state uses the doctrine simply to protect the weaker
party to a contract from the bad consequences of her decision, then it is
indeed paternalistic. But that is not the state’s only possible purpose.
Instead, the state’s “motive may reasonably be a self-regarding concern
not to facilitate or assist harmful, exploitative, or immoral action.”256 This
“self-regarding concern” arises because “the legal institution of contract
requires, through their role in enforcement, the participation and cooperation of parties outside the agreement—that is, it requires the cooperation
of the community, as it is embodied in the state.”257 So rather than
bespeaking an other-regarding concern for the weaker party’s well-being,
the “state’s refusal to enforce an unconscionable contract could reﬂect
an unwillingness to lend its support and its force to assist an exploitative
contract because it is an unworthy endeavor to support.”258 One sees this
alternative motivation at work in many of the decisions applying the
doctrine, in which “a dominant concern of judges is self-regarding: it is
to avoid facilitating the actions of an exploiter rather than to act to
protect the disadvantaged party.”259 That, of course, is precisely the same

whether the Constitution forbids the state’s apparently neutral use of its courts to enforce
contracts, including racially restrictive property agreements.”).
252. See generally Shiffrin, Paternalism, supra note 25. For a recent critique of
Shiffrin’s account, see Nicolas Cornell, A Complainant-Oriented Approach to
Unconscionability and Contract Law, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1131, 1153–57 (2016).
253. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2003); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 208 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
254. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 104 (1981); Alan Schwartz, A
Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053, 1071–76 (1977).
255. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
Md. L. Rev. 563, 631–38 (1982); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of
Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763, 764 (1983).
256. Shiffrin, Paternalism, supra note 25, at 224.
257. Id. at 221.
258. Id. at 223–30, 249–50.
259. Id. at 229 (citing illustrative cases).
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concern as in Shelley.260 Shiffrin thus reconceptualizes unconscionability
as a complicity-avoidance doctrine.261
While substantive, both Shelley and unconscionability respond to the
same fundamental problem as civil procedure’s delegation-policing
doctrines. Whether by abusing delegated procedural powers or by
seeking public support for their immoral projects, private parties can
render the state complicit in their wrongdoing. Shelley and unconscionability, just like civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines, enable the
state to avoid the worst forms of complicity.
C.

Complicity Avoidance, Not Due Process

If the logic of complicity avoidance underlies important doctrines in
civil procedure (among other legal domains), one might wonder why it
has escaped scholarly attention. The neglect may well owe to the hegemony of another normative logic in civil procedure doctrine and scholarship: procedural due process. In answering almost any procedural
question, courts and scholars alike reﬂexively invoke due process—if not
the concept itself, then at least its constituent values, such as fairness and
accuracy. Many readers thus might doubt the distinctiveness of complicity
avoidance and instead try to assimilate it to due process. There is considerable support for such a move, as both courts and commentators have
conceptualized delegation problems in other areas of the law in due
process terms.262 Yet, while civil procedure’s delegations of state power
can indeed raise signiﬁcant due process concerns, those concerns hardly
exhaust the delegations’ normative signiﬁcance. Even after accounting
for the threat to due process values, there remains the problem of state
complicity in abusive exercises of delegated power—a problem that civil
procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines are well tailored to address.

260. Shiffrin brieﬂy makes the connection to Shelley. See id. at 233 n.34.
261. One can give a similar account of other contract law doctrines that allow courts to
refuse to enforce private agreements on grounds of “public policy.” Beyond contract law,
another potential example of a substantive complicity-avoidance doctrine is the equitable
“clean hands” defense, which has traditionally been justiﬁed as a way for courts to avoid
abetting or countenancing private wrongdoing and to thereby preserve their “integrity.”
See Ori J. Herstein, A Normative Theory of the Clean Hands Defense, 17 Legal Theory
171, 176–78 (2011). But see id. at 188–89 (doubting whether the kinds of wrongdoing that
typically trigger the clean hands defense rise to the level of implicating the political
community).
262. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238, 326, 330–32 (1936) (analyzing
the validity of the price-setting provisions in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Davis, supra note 18, at 615–21
(identifying due process limits on private enforcement of regulatory laws); Lawrence,
supra note 42, at 672–95 (considering “the due process approach for handling private
delegation”); Rubenfeld, supra note 39, at 11–19 (discussing the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to Title IX investigations and adjudications conducted by private schools).
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Procedural due process has two main features, neither of which
quite ﬁts the structure of civil procedure’s delegation problem. First,
procedural due process reﬂects an ex ante concern with promoting
accuracy in governmental decisionmaking. The Supreme Court has
construed the Due Process Clause to require the government to follow
certain procedures before depriving people of their property (or, less
relevant in the civil context, their lives or liberty).263 According to the
Court, the purpose of this requirement is “to minimize substantively unfair
or mistaken deprivations of property” by the government.264 Procedural
due process thus seeks to prevent erroneous deprivations of property by
prescribing procedures that enhance the accuracy of governmental
decisionmaking.265
Civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines, by contrast, reﬂect
an ex post concern that goes beyond accurate decisionmaking. Even
when a civil justice system institutes procedures that reduce the risk of
erroneous outcomes to a tolerable level, those procedures will not
forestall every abuse of delegated state power. Nor will every kind of
abuse compromise the accuracy of the decisionmaking process. Yet civil
procedure still employs delegation-policing doctrines, which seek to
address abusive exercises of delegated state power as they are occurring
or after they have occurred, and irrespective of their effect on the
accuracy of the ultimate decision. Traditional notions of due process
can’t readily account for that function; complicity avoidance can.
Once again, civil Batson exemplifies the divergence between civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines and procedural due process. The
Court in Edmonson admittedly adverted to due process concerns in
justifying a ban on racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in civil
trials, noting how “[r]ace discrimination within the courtroom raises
serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there.”266
263. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). Thus, the question in the
canonical procedural due process cases of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), was whether recipients of certain federal beneﬁts
were entitled to a hearing before the government terminated their beneﬁts.
264. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81.
265. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and
Self-Help Repossession, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 893, 917–18 (1975) (“The basic purpose of
the procedural due process requirements associated with the right to a hearing on
adjudicative facts . . . is to minimize error in the ﬁnding of adjudicative facts.”). Some
scholars have attempted to ground due process in values other than accuracy. See, e.g.,
Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 158–253 (1985) (developing a
dignitarian theory of due process); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 181, 273–84 (2004) (arguing that participatory procedures enhance the legitimacy of
governmental decisions). These alternative conceptions of due process, however, can still
be distinguished from complicity avoidance on the second ground considered in this
section.
266. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
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It is also true that the traditional justiﬁcations for peremptory challenges
sound in due process.267 But Edmonson’s holding is both underinclusive
and overinclusive with respect to due process values. Rather than specify
ex ante various accuracy-undermining bases for making peremptory
challenges, the Court subjected peremptory challenges to ex post review
solely for discrimination. And rather than permit race-based peremptory
challenges that may be grounded in empirically justiﬁed generalizations,
the Court proscribed all race-based peremptory challenges categorically.268 These aspects of Edmonson’s holding belie the suggestion that the
Court was trying to enhance the overall accuracy of civil jury trials. They
instead suggest that the Court was trying to avoid state complicity in private discrimination as such.
Second, procedural due process is concerned with direct state action,
whereas civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines are concerned
with indirect state action. Due process constrains what the state may do to
private parties—the delegation-policing doctrines, what it may do for
private parties. Consider the prejudgment attachment and replevin cases.
Those cases were formally adjudicated under the Due Process Clause,
and the Court repeatedly emphasized the importance of predeprivation
hearings for promoting accurate decisionmaking.269 But the Court also
acknowledged that while in those cases “the inquiry is similar” to the
traditional due process analysis, “the focus is different.”270 Speciﬁcally,
“[p]rejudgment remedy statutes ordinarily apply to disputes between
private parties rather than between an individual and the government,”
and as such “are designed to enable one of the parties to ‘make use of
state procedures with the overt, signiﬁcant assistance of state officials.’”271
The state’s role, in other words, is limited to facilitating, rather than
directly regulating, private conduct. The Court thus had to gerrymander
the three-pronged due process balancing test articulated in Mathews v.
Eldridge,272 according “principal attention” to “the interest of the party
seeking the prejudgment remedy” rather than to any interest of the
government.273 More than just a minor doctrinal tweak, this modiﬁcation
fundamentally reconﬁgured the role of the state in the due process
analysis. The concept of complicity avoidance makes that reconﬁguration
seem less ad hoc.
267. See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“By allowing the litigant to strike jurors
for even the most subtle of discerned biases, the peremptory challenge fosters both the
perception and reality of an impartial jury.”).
268. Id. at 630–31.
269. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 13 (1991); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80–82.
270. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10.
271. Id. at 10–11 (quoting Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486
(1988)).
272. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
273. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11.
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For there to be state complicity, of course, there must be some
underlying private wrong for the state to be complicit in. And one can
indeed conceptualize some of the wrongs addressed by civil procedure’s
delegation-policing doctrines in due process terms, as some involve, or
contribute to, an arbitrary deprivation of property. But not all of them.
From civil Batson to Rule 11 to the abuse-of-process tort, the problem is
not that someone was or might be arbitrarily deprived of her property—
some of the doctrines can be triggered without any deprivation at all—
but that a private party has compromised certain public values in exercising state power. In any event, even when the underlying wrong does
implicate due process, the state’s role remains only secondary rather
than primary. The state does not act of its own initiative but rather lends
its coercive apparatus to private parties so they can achieve their own
ends. Complicity avoidance provides a distinct normative framework for
thinking about the state’s obligations when it has delegated its coercive
power to private parties rather than exercising that power itself.
D. Defending Complicity Avoidance—and Delegation
The complicity-avoidance logic employed in cases such as Edmonson
is not just a doctrinal construct. As this section argues, that logic resonates with fundamental principles of liberal political theory. The aim, to
be clear, is not to provide a deﬁnitive defense of complicity avoidance but
to show it to be a normatively attractive ideal in light of our legal system’s
other commitments. At the same time, complicity avoidance comes at a
cost: In attempting to avoid complicity in private wrongdoing, the state
forgoes many of the beneﬁts associated with delegating state power to
private parties in the ﬁrst place. The upshot, this section suggests, is that
sometimes there are good reasons for the state—and thus the entire political community—to tolerate a degree of complicity in private wrongdoing.
1. The Political Theory of Complicity Avoidance. — Civil procedure’s
delegations of state power run up against one of the most basic tenets of
liberal political theory: that the deﬁning feature of political power is its
coerciveness and that the central task of political theory is legitimating
and limiting that coercion. Contemporary liberalism proceeds from the
premise, most prominently associated with Max Weber, that the modern
state claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.274 This
premise gives rise to the need to specify the conditions that legitimate
the state’s use of coercion, which, in turn, involves identifying limits on
the state’s coercive power.275 These imperatives explain public law’s

274. See Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics (1919), reprinted in
Weber: Political Writings 310 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., 1994).
275. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 191 (1986) (describing “the classical
problem of the legitimacy of coercive power”).
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enduring focus on constraining state action.276 They also account for the
more recent anxiety about the “privatization” of various state
functions277: If state power is necessarily coercive, and if that power must
be subject to certain limits to be legitimate, then delegating state power
to private parties threatens to untether state coercion from its
legitimating constraints. All of this is reason enough to carefully attend to
civil procedure’s delegations of state power and its delegation-policing
doctrines.
A concern with coercion alone, however, doesn’t fully explain
courts’ additional concern with complicity in abusive exercises of
delegated state power. To appreciate that further worry, one must
understand the special nature of political power in a liberal democracy.
The political philosopher John Rawls, synthesizing the liberal socialcontract tradition, famously argued that democratic political power is
distinctive not just because of its coerciveness but also because of its
authorship. “[W]hile political power is always coercive power,” Rawls
explained, “in a constitutional regime it is the power of the public, that
is, the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body.”278 In a
democracy, in other words, political power is ultimately “citizens’
power”279—“a power in which all citizens have an equal share.”280 It is thus
doubly public: As coercive power, it’s vested with the state, per the
monopoly of physical force; and as democratic power, it’s collectively
authorized by the political community, per the social contract.281

276. See Amitai Etzioni, Reining in Private Agents, 101 Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 279,
279 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Etzioni.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KCJ8-TAX3] (“The Constitution and much of statutory law seek to
protect individual rights from intrusions by the government. It is the government’s
coercive power that must be constrained.”); Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court 2015
Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 46 & n.79 (2016)
(arguing that a primary ambition of constitutionalism is to constrain state power).
277. See supra notes 1–2, 140 and accompanying text.
278. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 68 (1996) [hereinafter Rawls, Political
Liberalism].
279. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 40–41 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
280. Id. at 183–84. This conception of political power differs fundamentally from that
of genuine libertarianism (as distinct from “classical” versions of liberalism), which
reduces political power to a “network of private contracts” and accordingly denies the
existence of any separate “public” realm. Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why
Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105, 107 (2001). For liberals, by
contrast, the establishment of political institutions constitutes a distinct public domain
subject to a distinct set of normative principles. Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Membership and
Political Obligation, 25 J. Pol. Phil. 3, 16 (2017) (“[T]he very idea of a ‘public’ is a
creation of political society; there is no public in the state of nature.”).
281. But see James Q. Whitman, Between Self-Defense and Vengeance/Between Social
Contract and Monopoly of Violence, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 901, 902 (2004) (presenting the
social contract and monopoly of violence as two opposing theories of the state).
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This means that the political community has a lot riding, morally
speaking, on how the state exercises its coercive power. As Arthur Ripstein
has explained, because political power in a democracy is authorized by
the political community as a whole, the state speaks in the name of the
political community whenever it exercises power through any of its
institutions.282 That includes when courts resolve private disputes through
civil litigation, which is among those “procedures and institutions [that]
can decide to act on behalf of everyone.”283 The political community thus
bears ultimate responsibility for how the state exercises its coercive power,
including how its courts adjudicate private disputes.284 And when the
state abuses its power, the political community becomes complicit in that
wrongdoing.285
Yet the liberal account of political power has much more sweeping
implications for the civil justice system than liberal political theorists have
appreciated. They tend to equate exercises of state power in civil litigation with judicial action, and thus assume that the political community’s
complicity extends only as far as the decisions of courts. But as this Article
has shown, the state doesn’t maintain exclusive control over its coercive
power in civil litigation. To be sure, as liberal political theorists have
rightly emphasized, the main point of a civil justice system is to provide
authoritative, public resolutions of private disputes.286 Along the way,
though, the state permits private parties to exercise various procedural
powers.287 As coercive powers of a democratic state, those powers are still
authorized by the members of the political community and exercised in
their name. The political community thus remains collectively responsible for how private parties exercise the delegated state powers during
civil litigation. Given the nature of democratic political power and the
division of labor between private parties and courts in civil litigation, the

282. See Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 Va. L.
Rev. 1391, 1435 (2006) [hereinafter Ripstein, Private Order].
283. Id. at 1428; see also Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 51, at 289 (“A court
resolving a private dispute purports to speak from . . . a public standpoint . . . .”); Shiffrin,
Remedial Clauses, supra note 6, at 420 (“[T]he judiciary serves as the community’s voice,
levying its response to an abrogation of a publicly recognized responsibility.”).
284. See Ripstein, Private Order, supra note 282, at 1435.
285. For more on the idea that the citizens of a democracy collectively authorize, and
thus bear responsibility for, many of the acts of their government, see generally Eric
Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy (2012); John M. Parrish, Collective
Responsibility and the State, 1 Int’l Theory 119 (2009); Anna Stilz, Collective
Responsibility and the State, 19 J. Pol. Phil. 190 (2011). But see Robert Jubb, Participation
in and Responsibility for State Injustices, 40 Soc. Theory & Prac. 51, 52–53 (2014)
(criticizing this idea).
286. See Ripstein, Private Order, supra note 282, at 1415–29.
287. See supra section I.B.
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complicity that concerns courts in cases such as Edmonson turns out to be
not just the complicity of the state but the complicity of us all.288
2. Balancing Complicity Avoidance and Delegation. — If the political
community can indeed become complicit in private exercises of
delegated state power during civil litigation, then perhaps we should just
eliminate the risk of complicity by eliminating the delegations. Rather
than delegate the state’s coercive prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory powers to potentially faithless private parties, the safer course might
be to vest those powers exclusively with more accountable governmental
officials. And yet, while civil procedure’s delegations entail signiﬁcant
moral costs for the state—much more signiﬁcant than civil procedure
scholars have appreciated—they also promise signiﬁcant beneﬁts. Those
beneﬁts counsel against eliminating civil procedure’s delegations and in
favor of taking the very approach civil procedure in fact takes: delegating
many of the state’s procedural powers to private parties but policing
those delegations for abuse.
Many of the beneﬁts of civil procedure’s delegations have been well
canvassed in the literature and are present across the civil docket, both in
private law and public law cases. In private law cases, delegating the civil
prosecutorial power to private parties empowers the victims of private
wrongs to directly vindicate their rights289 and reposes prosecutorial
discretion with those individuals who experience the costs and beneﬁts of
civil litigation most acutely.290 In cases with a public law dimension, scholars have recognized a number of additional beneﬁts associated with the
private enforcement of federal statutes, mostly stemming from various
practical advantages that private parties enjoy over administrative
288. This Article’s complicity-avoidance theory of civil procedure’s delegation-policing
doctrines shares certain affinities with Malcolm Thorburn’s public law theory of criminal
law’s justiﬁcation defenses. See Malcolm Thorburn, Criminal Law as Public Law, in
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law 21 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011);
Malcolm Thorburn, Justiﬁcations, Powers, and Authority, 117 Yale L.J. 1070, 1118 (2008)
[hereinafter Thorburn, Justiﬁcations]. But whereas Thorburn focuses on emergency
situations in which private parties must temporarily “stand in” for state officials, see
Thorburn, Justiﬁcations, supra, at 1076, 1107, 1118, 1125–26, this Article contends that
civil procedure delegates coercive state power to private parties on a continuing, rather
than emergency, basis, and that private parties don’t “stand in” for the state but rather are
permitted to use delegated state power primarily for their own purposes.
289. This is one of the main insights of civil recourse theory. See Goldberg & Zipursky,
Torts as Wrongs, supra note 50, at 981–82 (arguing that civil recourse “enables individuals
to assert claims as a matter of right without ﬁrst obtaining the permission or blessing of
government officials”); cf. Nagareda, supra note 18, at 191 (“In general, one of the
advantages of civil litigation lies in the ability of a private person to lodge a complaint in a
manner independent from the government.”).
290. See Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses, supra note 6, at 433 (“[W]ith the duties of
‘private’ law, because private parties bear the brunt of their burdens as well as the effects
of their violation, we generally assign private parties the power to pursue their vindication,
despite the underlying, concomitant public interest.”).
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agencies, including less vulnerability to capture, stronger enforcement
incentives, more resources, and greater access to information.291
Delegating state power has another set of interrelated beneﬁts that
have more to do with political morality than efficient policy implementation. Scholars have explored these beneﬁts in the context of settlement
and various forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), but they seem
to apply to the private exercise of other state procedural powers as well.
Most directly, delegating state procedural powers to private parties promotes individual autonomy by giving individuals some say over the
resolution of their disputes.292 Because of civil procedure’s delegations,
private parties can (within wide limits) delineate the contours of their
dispute in terms of claims and parties, decide how much and what kinds
of information they will exchange with each other during discovery, and
even set the terms of any resolution itself through settlement. This
autonomy, in turn, promises two further beneﬁts. First, rather than stoke
atomism, allowing private parties to exercise the state’s procedural
powers might actually foster communal solidarity, on the theory that
people develop a closer attachment to the law by enforcing it themselves.293 Second, delegation is also a way for the state to accommodate
291. For a good overview of these beneﬁts, see Clopton, Redundant, supra note 14, at
308–11; see also, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 54–60 (2002)
(considering the investigative and informational advantages of private parties); Stephen B.
Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark L.
Rev. 637, 662–67 (2013) (evaluating commonly made arguments regarding the beneﬁts of
private enforcement, including increasing prosecutorial resources, shifting costs from
public to private sources, and “facilitat[ing] participatory and democratic governance”);
Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Proﬁt Public Enforcement, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853,
912–13 (2014) (noting that “[f]inancial incentives blur the line between public and
private enforcement”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev.
93, 106–20 (2005) (discussing the potential advantages and disadvantages of private
enforcement). Scholars have ascribed similar beneﬁts to party-driven discovery. See, e.g.,
Carrington, supra note 96, at 55 (suggesting that discovery has helped to enable private
enforcement and reduce demand for government or bureaucratic intervention); Miller,
Simpliﬁed Pleading, supra note 77, at 356 (arguing that limits on discovery should be
calibrated so as to preserve “the civil enforcement role” performed by private litigation).
Beyond practical considerations, private enforcement responds to Americans’ traditional
ideological distrust of governmental power. See generally Robert Kagan, Adversarial
Legalism: The American Way of Law (2001) (connecting the United States’ preference for
private enforcement to Americans’ suspicion of the state).
292. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 Geo. L.J. 2663, 2692 (1995)
(“Settlements that are in fact consensual represent the goals of democratic and partyinitiated legal regimes by allowing the parties themselves to choose processes and
outcomes for dispute resolution.”); see also Edward Brunet, The Core Values of
Arbitration, in Edward Brunet et al., Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment 3
(2006) (making a similar autonomy-based argument for arbitration).
293. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 292, at 2688–89 (arguing that settlement can
allow for greater participation, and thus a closer connection to the law, than litigation); cf.
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pluralism. Some members of a liberal political community will inevitably
espouse values different from those embodied in the law and other
political institutions.294 By delegating its procedural powers, the state
gives private parties space to express those values in the course of
resolving their disputes.295
In light of delegation’s beneﬁts, the state might be drawn toward the
opposite extreme. Rather than avoid complicity in private wrongdoing by
eliminating civil procedure’s delegations and exercising all coercive
procedural powers itself, the state might try to get out of the disputeresolution business altogether, leaving it exclusively to private ordering.296
This strategy, however, runs up against another core liberal commitment:
the state’s obligation to provide a forum for the authoritative resolution
of private disputes.297 Indeed, liberalism has traditionally viewed the adjudication of private disputes as a way to augment the state’s authority and
enhance its legitimacy.298 Liberalism thus creates a dilemma for the state:
If the state attempts to avoid complicity in private wrongdoing by
exercising all coercive power itself, it forgoes the considerable beneﬁts of
delegation; but if it attempts to avoid complicity by completely outsourcing dispute resolution, it shirks its role as ﬁnal arbiter.
This Article does not attempt to resolve that dilemma. Neither the
delegation framework developed in Parts I and II nor the complicityavoidance theory developed in this Part can tell us exactly how much
power a civil justice system should delegate to private parties. Given all the
competing imperatives, however, it does seem that our current civil
justice system strikes a reasonable balance. Civil procedure’s delegations
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev.
1285, 1285 (2003) (arguing that “privatization can be a means of ‘publicization,’ through
which private actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public goals”).
294. This results from what Rawls called the “fact of reasonable pluralism.” Rawls,
Political Liberalism, supra note 278, at 36.
295. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 292, at 2672–78 (arguing that settlement allows
disputes to be decided according to values other than those embodied in the law); see also
Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conﬂict Resolution and the Search for
Community, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 27, 67–69 (2002) (identifying various
communitarian beneﬁts of arbitration). This is one of the main justiﬁcations given for
religious arbitration and, more generally, arbitration of disputes between the members of a
close-knit community. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The
Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 Yale. L.J. 2994, 3010–22 (2015) (discussing how
arbitration can “advance a shared set of objectives and values”).
296. Cf. Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 644 (considering a “model of disengagement” whereby judges would extricate themselves from settlement negotiations).
297. See supra note 286 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Radin, Threat, supra
note 46, at 295–97 (describing liberalism’s conception of the state’s role in resolving
private disputes).
298. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism 201–10 (1993); cf.
Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights
in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms 338 (2011) (showing how throughout history
courthouses and other sites of public dispute resolution have symbolized state authority).

This content downloaded from
147.4.185.116 on Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:51:24 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

2018]

DELEGATING PROCEDURE

1049

realize a number of practical and moral beneﬁts for individual litigants
and the political community at large, while its delegation-policing
doctrines help the political community to avoid becoming complicit in
the worst forms of abuse of those delegations. One can, of course, readily
envision perfectly legitimate civil justice systems that strike a different
balance—either delegating less state power to private parties to avoid
even more complicity in private wrongdoing or delegating even more
state power to better promote autonomy and accommodate pluralism.
The important point is to recognize the tradeoff between complicity
avoidance and other important values served by the delegation of state
power. Our civil justice system accepts a signiﬁcant degree of public
complicity in private wrongdoing for the sake of those other values,
rather than seeking to minimize any threat to the political community’s
moral integrity by maintaining exclusive state control over coercive state
power.
IV. TOWARD A DELEGATION-POLICING APPROACH TO ARBITRATION
The analytical framework developed in the previous Parts can shed
light on several procedural debates, both within ordinary civil litigation
and beyond it. Within ordinary civil litigation, this Article’s delegation
framework simultaneously highlights some of the beneﬁts and drawbacks
of current procedural practice. For example, although judges enjoy
substantial discretion to police discovery abuse, there is a widespread
impression that they rarely exercise it, with the result that discovery often
ends up devolving into a “free-for-all.”299 The delegation framework suggests that judges can respond to such problems (insofar as they’re real
problems)300 by more aggressively policing discovery for abuse ex post, in
contrast to the recent amendments to the discovery rules, which focus on
limiting the scope of discovery ex ante.301
The delegation framework also speaks to delegations of the state’s
dispute-resolution powers outside ordinary civil litigation. Such delegations include so-called “corporate settlement mills,” a practice in which
corporations that have been accused of wrongdoing essentially adjudicate victims’ claims, sometimes in ways that preclude the victims from
seeking relief in court.302 This Article’s framework conﬁrms the many
299. Pollis, supra note 91, at 2099.
300. Cf. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its
Fallacies and Functions, 90 Or. L. Rev. 1085, 1088–90 (2012) (arguing that the costs of
discovery are exaggerated); Spencer, supra note 157, at 1730 (same).
301. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
302. Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 Va.
L. Rev. 129, 136–41 (2015) (arguing that corporate settlement mills “privatize dispute
resolution nearly completely, and are subject to far weaker (if any) forms of public
regulation and oversight”).
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concerns that scholars have voiced about this practice and suggests the
outlines of a general approach to enhancing its legitimacy.
But however important these and other procedural issues may be,
the most pressing one remains arbitration. This Part accordingly revisits
the delegation critique of arbitration in light of what the previous Parts
have revealed about civil procedure’s own delegations of state power. As
section IV.A argues, proponents of the delegation critique rightly worry
that arbitration delegates signiﬁcant coercive power to private parties and
that, under current Supreme Court precedent, private parties can abuse
that power with virtual impunity. In the end, though, the delegations of
state power in arbitration are conceptually continuous with those in
ordinary civil litigation; the former may lend themselves to more egregious forms of abuse, but both sets of delegations fundamentally raise the
same kinds of concerns. This continuity suggests an alternative approach
to arbitration’s delegation problem: adapting civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines for arbitration’s delegations.
Section IV.B begins to take up that task. This Article’s approach
focuses less on the enforceability of arbitration clauses and more on the
reviewability of arbitral proceedings and awards. Whereas holding broad
classes of arbitration clauses unenforceable effectively restricts private
parties’ access to arbitration’s delegations before any abuse has occurred,
reviewing arbitral proceedings and awards allows courts to police those
delegations for abuse after the fact—the primary strategy civil procedure
employs with respect to the delegations in ordinary civil litigation. There
may indeed be compelling reasons to severely restrict access to arbitration’s
delegations ex ante. But short of that, the lesson of civil procedure’s
delegations is that many of the concerns about delegated state power in
arbitration can be addressed by policing arbitration’s delegations for
abuse ex post.
A.

Delegating Procedure Redux

1. The Delegation Critique Defended. — Proponents of the delegation
critique tend to portray arbitration as a radical departure from ordinary
civil litigation. Whereas public institutions and officials discharge the
state’s dispute-resolution functions in ordinary civil litigation, most
scholars suppose, arbitration “privatizes” or “outsources” many of those
functions.303 We can now see that this contrast is overdrawn.304 Ordinary
civil litigation likewise delegates many of the state’s dispute-resolution
functions to private parties, thereby vesting them with signiﬁcant coercive
power.
303. See supra notes 6–9, 31–33 and accompanying text.
304. And not just because of practices such as contract procedure and court-annexed
ADR. See supra notes 10, 26.

This content downloaded from
147.4.185.116 on Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:51:24 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

2018]

DELEGATING PROCEDURE

1051

This is not to say that scholars have been wrong to worry about the
delegations of state power involved in arbitration. On the contrary, those
delegations raise the same basic concerns as the delegations in ordinary
civil litigation. To be sure, what this Article calls the “delegation critique”
actually comprises a number of related, but distinct, criticisms, including
the following: Binding dispute resolution is an inherently “public
function” that should not be delegated to private parties except subject
to strict limits,305 private parties should not be able to use procedure to
insulate themselves from liability for violating substantive rights,306 and
private parties should generally be prohibited from making law.307 Scholars
have further argued that adjudication not only resolves private disputes
but also realizes a number of public goods that arbitration forgoes—most
notably, the production of legal precedent to guide the resolution of
future cases308 and public transparency about violations of substantive
law.309 And whereas civil litigation proceeds (largely) in open court,
arbitration is almost completely shielded from public scrutiny.310
While it is important to recognize the differences among these
various criticisms of arbitration, each ultimately presumes the kind of
delegation identiﬁed in Part I. Each problem, that is, arises only because
arbitration allows private parties to tap the coercive power of the state
without any meaningful judicial oversight. Thus, private parties perform
the inherently “public function” of dispute resolution only insofar as
their decisions are binding—more or less automatically backed by the
305. See, e.g., Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 997–99; cf. Davis &
Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 533 (raising similar concerns about contract procedure).
Resnik’s concerns about “privatization” and “outsourcing” can also be understood in
these terms. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Radin, Fine Print, supra note 8, at 33–34; Glover, supra note 8, at 3075–
76; David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind. L.J. 239,
240–42 (2012) [hereinafter Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration]; Schwartz, Small
Print, supra note 8, at 110.
307. See, e.g., Horton, Delegation, supra note 7, at 480; David Horton, Mass Arbitration
and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 459, 501–02 (2014).
308. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the
Common Law, 2 J. Am. Arb. 1, 11–12 (2003); Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died:
Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. Ill. L. Rev. 371, 409–13; Charles L. Knapp,
Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761,
785 (2002); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1,
30 (2004). This criticism echoes Owen Fiss’s classic critique of settlement. See Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that settlement stymies
the development of the law).
309. See, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2894–900; Sternlight,
Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 27, at 1664–65; cf. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 10, at
513–14 (raising similar concerns about contract procedure).
310. See, e.g., Resnik, Access, supra note 6, at 133–42; Judith Resnik, Courts: In and
out of Sight, Site, and Cite: The Norman Shachoy Lecture, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 771, 799–809
(2008); Resnik, Uncovering, supra note 6, at 549–51; Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether
Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1101, 1137 (2006).
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coercive power of the state.311 Private parties can use procedure to evade
substantive legal obligations only insofar as courts will more or less
automatically enforce their procedural choices. Privately made rules
constitute “law” only insofar as they’re coercively enforced without any
real judicial review.312 Arbitration forgoes the public goods of precedent
and transparency only insofar as private parties can authoritatively resolve
their disputes unsupervised. And private parties can shield dispute resolution from public scrutiny only insofar as their authoritative decisions
are insulated from judicial review, which would be subject to public
scrutiny. None of these problems would be so acute if a party to an
arbitration agreement could, notwithstanding the agreement, either
litigate her dispute in court or at least obtain meaningful judicial review
of any arbitral award;313 each problem stems from the fact that the state
coercively enforces arbitration without adequate scrutiny. This is the
sense in which arbitration can be understood to delegate state power.314
And the current arbitration regime does indeed pervasively delegate
state power in precisely that sense. As others have recognized, the FAA,
which governs the relationship between courts and arbitration, contains
multiple delegations on its face.315 On the front end, the Act requires
federal district courts, upon motion, to compel arbitration and to stay any
related judicial proceedings in any dispute subject to a valid arbitration
clause.316 As for the arbitral proceedings themselves, the FAA authorizes
the parties to choose a method for appointing an arbitrator and, by extension, the procedures she will follow.317 Whomever they appoint, in turn, is
empowered to subpoena nonparty witnesses and documentary evidence.318
311. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 997 (arguing that, in contrast
to nonbinding dispute resolution, “[t]he binding resolution of disputes is, of course, a
traditionally exclusive public function”).
312. See Horton, Delegation, supra note 7, at 441, 444 (arguing that the FAA, as
construed by the Supreme Court, “allows private parties to engage in lawmaking” by
“mak[ing] arbitration clauses enforceable with few restrictions” and “allow[ing] drafters
to cut judges out of the loop”).
313. Before the FAA, the “revocability doctrine” allowed a party to an arbitration
agreement to revoke the agreement and litigate her dispute in court at any time before an
arbitral award was rendered. See Ian R. Macneil, American Arbitration Law: Reformation,
Nationalization, Internalization 20 (1992).
314. Cf. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 10, at 535 (linking the concern that contract
procedure “privatiz[es],” “outsource[es],” or “delegate[es]” the state’s dispute-resolution
powers with the concern that it forgoes various “public goods” associated with litigation).
315. See, e.g., Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, supra note 9, at 109;
Horton, Delegation, supra note 7, at 480; Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at
1006; Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 9, at 42.
316. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2012).
317. Id. § 5. If the arbitration clause fails to specify a method or if the parties fail to
follow the speciﬁed method, then the court may appoint an arbitrator. Id.
318. Id. § 7. Courts are divided over whether this provision permits arbitrators to
compel prehearing “discovery” from nonparties or only the production of documents and
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Although a subpoena issues “in the name of the arbitrator” and under
her signature, the parties can petition a federal district court for an order
compelling compliance, on pain of sanctions.319 On the back end, if the
agreement so provides, a party may seek a court order conﬁrming any
arbitral award,320 with the order “hav[ing] the same force and effect, in
all respects, as, and be[ing] subject to all the provisions of law relating to,
a judgment in an action,” such that “it may be enforced as if it had been
rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.”321 The FAA thus
repeatedly endows the decisions of private parties and their chosen
arbitrators with the full and virtually automatic coercive backing of the
state322—a delegation of state power.
What is more, in contrast to ordinary civil litigation, the FAA lacks
any meaningful mechanisms for policing its delegations. In fact, the Act,
as construed by the Supreme Court, affirmatively frustrates almost all
judicial delegation-policing efforts, severely limiting the ability of courts
to review a privately chosen arbitrator’s actions before coercively enforcing them.323 Courts generally may not scrutinize an arbitrator’s subpoena
for relevance or materiality before compelling compliance with it.324
While the Act specifies various grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting an arbitral award,325 the Supreme Court has held that those grounds
are exclusive and cannot be augmented, even by private agreement.326
the appearance of witnesses at an actual arbitral “hearing.” See Randy J. Sutton,
Annotation, Discovery in Federal Arbitration Proceedings, 45 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 51, §§ 13–16
(2010) (collecting cases).
319. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
320. Id. § 9.
321. Id. § 13.
322. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 279, 296 (2004) (noting that arbitral awards
“generally are ﬁnal, binding, and enforceable by courts, and generally may not be reversed
on substantive grounds”).
323. See Horton, Delegation, supra note 7, at 489–93; Resnik, Diffusing Disputes,
supra note 6, at 2810.
324. See, e.g., In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2000)
(refusing to require district courts to “make an independent assessment of the materiality”
of information sought in a subpoena before enforcing it); Festus & Helen Stacy Found.,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner, & Smith Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379–80 (N.D.
Ga. 2006) (holding that determining the “relevance of the subpoenaed materials . . .
should be left to the arbitration panel”). But see Oceanic Transp. Corp. of Monrovia v.
Alcoa S.S. Co., 129 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that the district court had a
duty to determine “whether or not the subpoenaed material would be material as
evidence”).
325. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11.
326. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). But see Richard C.
Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1103,
1110–16 (2009) [hereinafter Reuben, Personal Autonomy] (identifying various
nonstatutory grounds for vacatur that State and lower federal courts had developed before
Hall Street).
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Each of the enumerated grounds, moreover, is quite narrow. For
example, most of the grounds for vacatur require egregious abuse during
the proceedings, such as fraud or corruption, that actually infects the
ﬁnal award.327 Only one of the grounds concerns the merits of the award,
permitting vacatur “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, ﬁnal, and deﬁnite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.”328 Yet, the Court has held that
“[i]t is not enough” under this provision “to show that the [arbitrator]
committed an error—or even a serious error”;329 a court must uphold an
award so long as the arbitrator “even arguably constru[ed] or appl[ied]
the [parties’] contract.”330 The FAA, in short, requires federal courts to
coercively enforce all but the most ﬂagrantly abusive decisions of privately appointed arbitrators. Given the statute’s broad delegations and
dearth of delegation-policing mechanisms, it seems fair to conclude
along with proponents of the delegation critique that the FAA has
“aggrandized private parties.”331
Scholars are right to worry about this state of affairs and to decry the
Supreme Court’s seeming nonchalance toward the FAA’s broad delegations of state power. In addition to all of the concerns raised by proponents of the delegation critique, this Article has highlighted the risk that
private parties will abuse delegations such as those in the FAA, violating
important public values and potentially rendering the entire political
community complicit in their wrongdoing. Perhaps we could tolerate
that risk if, as in ordinary civil litigation, courts possessed meaningful
mechanisms to repudiate abusive exercises of delegated power in arbitration. But the Supreme Court has largely eviscerated what few delegationpolicing mechanisms the FAA arguably contains.
2. Beyond Enforceability. — Proponents of the delegation critique have
proposed to address this problem primarily by curbing arbitration—
essentially, limiting private parties’ access to the FAA’s delegations of state
power. They would do so in two ways. On the one hand, many scholars
would have courts refuse to enforce arbitration clauses in broad categories of disputes, particularly disputes between sophisticated parties and
individual consumers or employees, mandating that such disputes be
resolved exclusively through court-based adjudication.332 Because the
327. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(3).
328. Id. § 10(a)(4).
329. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010)).
330. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting E. Associated Coal Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)).
331. Horton, Delegation, supra note 7, at 456.
332. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix,
Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from Unconscionable Contractual Forum-
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arbitration clauses governing such disputes almost always appear in
contracts of adhesion, scholars argue that courts should either refuse to
enforce adhesive arbitration clauses outright or, to similar effect,
rigorously assess the “voluntariness” of such clauses, deﬁning “voluntariness” in a way that precludes enforcement.333 On the other hand,
some scholars would have courts enforce only those arbitration clauses
that provide for arbitration proceedings that closely mirror ordinary civil
litigation.334 Arbitration, on this view, would be much less disconcerting if
it resembled the proverbial “day in court,” with ample discovery, an
impartial adjudicator, and adequate remedies. To be sure, some of these
same scholars simultaneously advocate enhanced judicial review of
arbitral awards and proceedings—but only as part of a belt-andsuspenders approach rather than as a distinct strategy.335 And they
ultimately put more weight on limiting the enforcement of arbitration
clauses, as opposed to more closely scrutinizing the outputs of arbitration
proceedings.336

Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 Hastings L.J. 719, 756–60 (2015); Resnik,
Privatization, supra note 6, at 1812; Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 1017–
34; Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What If the Bellwether Cases Were
Decided by a Truly Conservative Court?, 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 883, 922–24 (2012). Scholars
have made similar proposals for other forms of procedural private ordering, such as
forum-selection clauses. See, e.g., Paul B. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and
Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331, 332, 351–61, 401; Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice
of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court,
57 Fordham L. Rev. 291, 362–63 (1988).
333. See supra notes 27, 332 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes, supra note 6, at 2811, 2921; Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 600; Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 1046–101; Teresa J. Verges, Evolution of the
Arbitration Forum as a Response to Mandatory Arbitration, 18 Nev. L.J. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 5, 18–19, 22) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); cf. Sarah
Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1145,
1147–51 (2004) (considering the extension of civil Batson to arbitration); Paul R. Verkuil,
Privatizing Due Process, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 963, 983–86 (2005) (arguing that arbitration
should be shaped by due process values).
335. See, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2811 (advocating “oversight
on both process and outcomes ex post” alongside various ex ante restrictions on
enforceability); Stone, Rustic Justice, supra note 7, at 1025–28 (advocating due process
protections, heightened review, and reinstatement of the revocability doctrine).
336. See, e.g., Horton, Delegation, supra note 7, at 493–96 (calling for greater judicial
review of arbitration but emphasizing review of arbitration clauses as part of the
enforceability and arbitrability analyses, rather than review of arbitral awards and
proceedings as part of the vacatur and conﬁrmation analyses). Scholars have recently
begun to address these kinds of proposals to administrative agencies as well as courts. See,
e.g., Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 991, 993–94 (2017)
(advocating greater administrative regulation of arbitration); David L. Noll, Regulating
Arbitration, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 985, 1031–33 (2017) (same). But see Zachary D. Clopton,
Class Actions and Executive Power, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 878, 884, 887 (2017) (identifying
drawbacks of an administrative approach).
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This emphasis on the enforceability of arbitration clauses is understandable as a practical matter. For at least as currently construed by the
Supreme Court, the FAA gives courts somewhat more leeway to keep
disputes out of arbitration in the ﬁrst place than to reassert control over
them once they’ve been shunted there—either by deeming an arbitration
clause unenforceable under State and federal law doctrines preserved by
the Act’s “savings clause”337 or as part of determining whether the parties
actually agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute (the so-called arbitrability
determination).338
Scholars have also adduced deeply principled reasons for restricting
access to arbitration’s delegations in broad categories of cases. First,
sophisticated parties, such as corporations, frequently insert arbitration
clauses into contracts of adhesion with ordinary individuals, a practice
that, many believe, allows them to exploit the FAA’s delegations to
effectively force individuals to relinquish their right to their “day in
court” for a one-sided arbitration proceeding.339 Many have argued that
the FAA was never intended to apply to such contracts but only to
contracts between sophisticated commercial parties.340 The exploitative
nature of these agreements is exempliﬁed for many scholars by arbitration clauses that forbid class arbitration even in so-called negative-value

337. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The Court has, however, signiﬁcantly cabined the savings
clause, interpreting § 2 to preempt a number of State law doctrines, and to displace a
number of federal law doctrines, that would keep more categories of disputes in court.
See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013)
(declining to apply the federal effective-vindication doctrine); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011) (ﬁnding that California’s unconscionability
doctrine “interferes with arbitration”).
338. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443–45 (2006)
(discussing arbitrability). Unless, that is, the parties agreed to delegate that determination
to the arbitrator. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 78 (2010) (allowing
parties to delegate the arbitrability determination to arbitrators). For a critical overview of
such “delegation clauses,” see generally David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70
Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
339. See, e.g., Radin, Fine Print, supra note 8, at 19–32; Horton, Delegation, supra
note 7, at 486–89; Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2808, 2839–40, 2863–74; see
also Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 55, 72–74 (2004); Knapp, supra note 308, at 788–89; David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1247, 1249 (2009); Sternlight, Mandatory
Arbitration, supra note 27, at 1648–53. Scholars have criticized other forms of procedural
private ordering on similar grounds. See, e.g., Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 10, at 1105.
340. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Imre Szalai, Outsourcing Justice: The Rise of Modern Arbitration Laws in
America 188–89 (2013); Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 Tex. L. Rev.
265, 300–20 (2015). Many proponents of the delegation critique sympathize with this
argument, see, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2836–38, though their
concerns about “privatization” and “outsourcing” do not depend on it.
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cases, in which the costs of prosecuting the case on an individual basis
(either in arbitration or a lawsuit) exceed any potential recovery.341
Second, whereas most scholars tend to view arbitration’s delegations
as differing from civil procedure’s in kind, this Article has essentially
argued that the two differ in degree; arbitration and ordinary civil
litigation may differ in the extent to which each delegates state power, but
they do not differ in the fact that each delegates state power. Even
accepting that characterization, however, one might think that the difference in degree makes all the difference. Civil procedure delegates various
procedural powers piecemeal while retaining as the ﬁnal decisionmaker
a public official who is constrained by both substantive law and
procedural rules and who must give public reasons for her decisions;
arbitration, by contrast, authorizes private parties to assign the state’s
dispute-resolution function wholesale to a private decisionmaker.
Both sets of concerns have a lot of merit, but they have been fully
aired in the literature, as have the resulting proposals to dramatically
curtail arbitration.342 Notwithstanding the extensive scholarly criticism,
the Supreme Court has steadfastly adhered to its decades-old jurisprudence upholding the enforceability of adhesive arbitration clauses against
individual consumers and employees.343 What proponents of the delegation critique have missed is that civil procedure contains the seeds of
another kind of response to arbitration’s delegation problem, one with
its own, distinct logic. Even if courts continue to enforce arbitration
clauses that many scholars consider problematic, we should empower
courts to repudiate the abuses of delegated state power that occur during
arbitration after the fact.
A delegation-policing approach holds promise notwithstanding the
signiﬁcant differences between arbitration and ordinary civil litigation.
The power asymmetries between the parties do indeed tend to be more
pronounced in arbitration than in civil litigation, and arbitration involves
the wholesale delegation of the state’s dispute-resolution powers to
privately chosen arbitrators, in contrast to the piecemeal delegations in
civil litigation. In light of all this, many scholars worry that sophisticated
parties can use arbitration to effectively suppress legal claims, making
arbitral proceedings so one-sided that no victim of wrongdoing would
bother to invoke them to seek redress.344 But adopting delegation-policing
341. For a cogent indictment of class-arbitration bans, see Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at
2313–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class:
Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623,
628–29 (2012).
342. See supra notes 6–9, 339 and accompanying text.
343. Cf. Markovits, supra note 153, at 487 (“Arbitration . . . is here to stay.”).
344. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Resnik, Access, supra note
6, at 143–54 (reporting empirical ﬁndings that individual consumers rarely use
arbitration).
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doctrines might still go at least some way toward addressing this concern.
If courts reviewed arbitral awards and proceedings more rigorously before
enforcing the awards—if arbitration’s delegations were better policed—
the prospect of such review might have a feedback effect of rendering
those processes less one-sided in many cases. It might then become more
worthwhile for would-be plaintiffs to actually go through with an
arbitration when their claims were subject to a valid arbitration clause.
Greater policing ex post, in short, might help to make arbitration fairer
ex ante.
To be clear, such ex post delegation-policing strategies may be insufﬁcient to resolve some of the biggest controversies surrounding arbitration. It may be impossible, for example, to address the problems posed
by class-arbitration bans without prohibiting them ex ante. Nonetheless,
we can combat a signiﬁcant amount of abuse by having courts police
arbitration ex post, through analogues of civil procedure’s delegationpolicing doctrines.
B.

Policing Arbitration’s Delegations

This section begins to think about how we might recast civil procedure’s delegation-policing doctrines to fit arbitration’s delegations of state
power. Given the magnitude of the task, the doctrinal proposals outlined
here are necessarily impressionistic. This section aims only to give a general sense of what a delegation-policing approach to arbitration might
look like rather than to develop a comprehensive program for reform. In
doing so, however, this section attempts to illustrate how we can look to
civil procedure to allay some of the concerns about arbitration.
1. Rescinding Delegations. — The FAA currently contains no cognates
of the doctrines in civil procedure that rescind delegated state powers
when they’re being abused. It seems, however, that such doctrines could
play a salutary role in arbitration too. One possibility would be to amend
the FAA to provide for interlocutory judicial review of certain procedural
decisions made during an arbitration and for the termination of the
arbitration if a court determined that any of those decisions were abusive.345 The proposal might work as follows. Unless an arbitration clause
was exploitative on its face, a court would compel arbitration upon the
defendant’s request and stay any related judicial proceedings initiated by
the plaintiff. But the plaintiff would be allowed to return to court during
the course of the arbitration to challenge some of the arbitrator’s
345. It is important to distinguish this proposed review from interlocutory appellate
review of district court decisions regarding arbitration. The FAA already provides for such
appeals, though only from district court decisions refusing to enforce an arbitration
clause. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) (2012) (permitting interlocutory appeals from
district court refusals to compel arbitration), with id. § 16(b)(2) (forbidding most
interlocutory appeals from district court orders compelling arbitration).
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procedural decisions. If the court agreed with the plaintiff that the
arbitrator had abused her delegated powers in making those decisions, it
would discontinue the arbitration and lift the stay on the plaintiff’s
lawsuit, thereby reasserting state control over delegated disputeresolution powers.
This proposal would help to address some of the procedural
deﬁciencies in arbitration identiﬁed by proponents of the delegation
critique. As noted earlier, scholars have faulted arbitration for all too
frequently denying plaintiffs the kinds of procedural protections they
would enjoy in ordinary civil litigation, particularly a meaningful
opportunity to obtain discovery and present evidence.346 When an
arbitrator denies those opportunities, and when the plaintiff can’t make
her case without them, a court could deem the arbitrator’s decision an
abuse of the state’s dispute-resolution powers and reassert state authority
over the dispute. The bar for what constitutes “abuse” would, of course,
have to be set quite high. It would not be sufficient for a plaintiff simply
to disagree with an arbitrator’s determination that, say, a particular
document wasn’t discoverable or the testimony of a particular witness was
cumulative. But it seems reasonable to rescind delegated state powers
from an arbitrator whose procedural decisions clearly thwart a fair
resolution of the dispute.347
This proposal prompts an obvious objection: Permitting interlocutory judicial review of arbitrators’ procedural decisions would invite a ﬂood
of piecemeal appeals, which would undermine the beneﬁts of arbitration
and burden the courts. This problem could be substantially ameliorated,
however, by making interlocutory review discretionary with the court
rather than as of right,348 and limiting such review to just a few key procedural decisions, such as the decisions whether to permit discovery and
the presentation of evidence. And courts could further discourage abuse
of the interlocutory-review mechanism by imposing sanctions for review
petitions that did not even plausibly allege an abuse of delegated power.
2. Withholding Enforcement. — The FAA already contains a few provisions that, properly construed, could provide a basis for implementing a
strategy of withholding coercive enforcement from abusive exercises of
delegated power in arbitration. For one, the FAA authorizes federal district
346. See supra notes 28, 334 and accompanying text.
347. The FAA does already authorize federal courts to vacate a ﬁnal arbitral award
when the arbitrator “refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). But courts have interpreted this provision narrowly. See,
e.g., La. Dep’t of Nat. Res. ex rel. Coastal Prot. Restoration Auth. v. FEMA, No. 17-30140,
2018 WL 611215, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018) (noting that vacatur under § 10(a)(3) is
permitted only in “very unusual circumstances”). And in any case, a party shouldn’t have
to await a ﬁnal award before being able to challenge egregious abuse by an arbitrator.
348. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (authorizing discretionary interlocutory appeals from
class-certiﬁcation decisions).
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courts to compel compliance with an arbitrator’s subpoena of a nonparty
witness.349 Although courts tend to rubber-stamp arbitral subpoenas,350
one could imagine a regime in which judges scrutinized the subpoenas
more closely and refused to compel compliance with those that abuse the
state’s investigatory powers.
For another, the Supreme Court could overturn its precedents narrowly interpreting the provisions of the FAA governing the conﬁrmation,
vacatur, and modiﬁcation of ﬁnal arbitral awards and permit closer
judicial review of such awards (though given its current composition, the
Court is unlikely to change course anytime soon).351 Courts would not, of
course, review arbitral awards de novo but would instead apply something
more akin to the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard for
judicial review of the decisions of administrative agencies.352 While many
scholars have advocated greater judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards, this
Article’s delegation framework grounds that proposal in a distinct logic
rather than seeing it as just another way to curb arbitration.
Bolstering judicial review would go some way toward addressing a
signiﬁcant concern with arbitration: that most arbitrators are biased in
favor of the repeat players that pay their fees and generate most of their
business.353 The Constitution requires an impartial arbitrator.354 But this
349. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
350. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
351. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (specifying the procedures for conﬁrmation, vacatur,
correction, and modiﬁcation of an arbitral award); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note
6, at 2882 (lamenting that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly stipulated the adequacy of
arbitrations and rejected judicial monitoring of the outcomes”).
352. The model would be the more deferential variant of arbitrary and capricious
review. But cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 Mich. L. Rev.
899, 903 (1996) (advocating “hard look” review of class action settlements in mass-tort
cases). Instituting even such limited review, however, would at the very least require
overruling the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). See supra
notes 327–330 and accompanying text. Some State and lower federal courts appear to
hold out the possibility of arbitrary and capricious review for arbitral awards, but such
“claims almost always fail.” Reuben, Personal Autonomy, supra note 326, at 1115. Another
alternative would be to expand some courts’ practice of reviewing arbitral awards for a
“manifest disregard of the law,” see id. at 1110–13, though understanding that standard to
restrict arbitrators’ discretion more than it currently does, see id. at 1111 (noting that
“few” courts actually set aside arbitral awards for manifest disregard).
353. See, e.g., Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 1064–67 (describing
the “repeat player phenomenon”); Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration, supra note
306, at 248 (“[T]he system of arbitration as a structural matter creates financial
incentives to decide questions of arbitrator jurisdiction (‘who decides’) and even merits
issues favorably toward those who pay them.”); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael
Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. Times (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (citing records showing that “41
arbitrators each handled 10 or more cases for one company between 2010 and 2014”).
354. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
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requirement confronts a well-recognized dilemma: If a repeat-player
defendant pays an arbitrator’s fees, the arbitrator may be incentivized to
rule for the defendant, in the hope that it will continue to send disputes
her way; yet a defendant can’t require an individual plaintiff to pay all of
the arbitrator’s (considerable) fees, lest it effectively foreclose all relief.
Notwithstanding this dilemma, scholars have argued that courts should
refuse to enforce arbitration clauses that create even the potential for
subtle forms of bias.355 Under a delegation-policing approach, by contrast,
a court would review an arbitral award for arbitrariness or capriciousness.
While that standard would still afford arbitrators signiﬁcant discretion, it
would ﬁlter out those proceedings in which the arbitrator was actually
biased and the bias infected the award by prompting the arbitrator to
rule based on partiality for the defendant rather than any legal or
contractual ground.356 The prospect of such review, moreover, could
potentially deter many forms of bias. This proposal could be grounded in
the provision of the FAA permitting vacatur based on “evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators,”357 but understanding “partiality” and
“corruption” more capaciously than courts currently do.358 That broader
conception seems justified once one recognizes that arbitrators are vested
with signiﬁcant state power and therefore have a responsibility to exercise that power consistent with important public values.
One practical hurdle this proposal would have to surmount is that
there is no right to a reasoned opinion in arbitration, and arbitrators
rarely provide one (though sometimes a transcript of the arbitrator’s
decision is available).359 The lack of a reasoned opinion could frustrate
judicial review in many cases, preventing a party from proving that the
arbitrator or other party abused delegated state power. Short of requiring
reasoned opinions in all arbitrations, courts could impose a “penalty
default”360 in the absence of such an opinion, shifting the burden to the
355. See, e.g., Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 1062–67 (calling for
inquiries into “passive bias” and “structural bias”).
356. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980) (holding that, to prove a
violation of the right to conﬂict-free counsel, a defendant must show “that his counsel
actively represented conﬂicting interests”).
357. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).
358. See, e.g., Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278,
283 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“[I]n nondisclosure cases, an award may not be vacated
because of a trivial or insubstantial prior relationship between the arbitrator and the
parties to the proceeding.”).
359. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 9, at 1082–91 (canvassing
arguments for and against reasoned opinions but recognizing that there is no constitutional right to a reasoned opinion).
360. Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (deﬁning a “penalty default”
as a default rule that is “purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in order to
encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially
the courts)”).
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party seeking conﬁrmation or opposing vacatur to prove that the alleged
abuse of delegated power did not in fact occur. This would likely have the
effect of incentivizing parties to require their chosen arbitrators to
prepare reasoned opinions, just as expanded judicial review in general
would likely incentivize arbitrators to exercise their powers more
dispassionately.
3. Punishing Abuse. — Finally, courts could punish abuse of delegated
state power during arbitration by imposing sanctions during actions to
conﬁrm arbitral awards. The standard for imposing sanctions would
resemble Rule 11’s “improper purpose” standard.361 According to such a
standard, sanctions would be warranted when one party sought to
conﬁrm an arbitral award that issued from severely defective proceedings
or sought conﬁrmation after having forced the other party into
arbitration for some illegitimate reason, such as to deprive her of an
effective remedy for her injuries.362 Courts could impose sanctions under
either Rule 11 itself or their inherent powers.363 States could also create a
cause of action for “abuse of arbitral process,” lying against the party who
compelled the arbitration or the arbitrator herself, depending on who was
ultimately responsible for the abuse.364 By punishing abuse of arbitration’s delegations, the state would not only repudiate the abuse but also
incentivize private parties and arbitrators to design and conduct arbitrations in accordance with important public values.
***
The foregoing proposals are not without their problems.365 Those
who are skeptical of arbitration will likely worry that the various delegation-policing strategies, with their reliance on ex post judicial review,
would prove too burdensome for the parties they’re primarily designed
to help—namely, individuals seeking redress against sophisticated
361. See supra notes 209–211 and accompanying text.
362. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (considering, in
assessing a forum-selection clause for “fundamental fairness,” whether the defendant
included the clause with the “bad-faith motive” of “discouraging [plaintiffs] from
pursuing legitimate claims”).
363. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
364. Creating a cause of action against arbitrators would require overturning decisions
cloaking them in absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch.,
Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990). See generally Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining
Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 Minn. L. Rev.
449 (2004) (arguing that arbitrators should enjoy only qualiﬁed, not absolute, immunity).
365. So long as they were limited to purely domestic arbitrations, none of the
proposals would put the United States in violation of its obligations under the New York
Convention, which governs the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. See Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention),
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2157, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2012)
(prescribing procedures for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in federal court).
This Article does not address the distinct issues presented by international arbitration.
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parties. Yet while plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers may currently have
inadequate incentives to challenge arbitral awards and procedures, the
calculus would be different if the delegation-policing strategies outlined
above were adopted. Indeed, with stronger delegation-policing doctrines,
it might even be easier to challenge arbitral awards and procedures after
the fact than to oppose sending a dispute to arbitration in the ﬁrst place.
That’s because the primary legal bases for resisting the enforcement of
an arbitration clause—the State contract law doctrines of public policy
and unconscionability and the federal effective-vindication doctrine366—
all turn on speculative inquiries about the likely conduct of the arbitration proceedings in a given case or set of cases, whereas the delegationpolicing doctrines respond to abuse that has already occurred.
Supporters of arbitration, on the other hand, will likely worry that the
delegation-policing strategies would threaten to vitiate many of arbitration’s purported benefits, such as finality, informality, and speed.367 Some
scholars have suggested that these benefits are exaggerated, as arbitration
has increasingly come to resemble litigation.368 But whatever the merits of
that debate, the delegation-policing approach advocated here would likely
undermine arbitration primarily in one-off disputes between unequal
parties—precisely the kinds of disputes in which arbitration is most likely
to involve abuse. For the weaker party in such disputes would have little
reason not to invoke the delegation-policing doctrines. In disputes
between sophisticated parties, by contrast, the parties would be more
likely to have an ongoing relationship and thus would be more loath to
invoke the delegation-policing doctrines, lest they undermine the
efficiency advantages of arbitration for their future disputes.369 It is also
366. See supra note 337.
367. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169, 2240–
41, 2243 (1993); see also Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008)
(explaining that limiting judicial review “maintain[s] arbitration’s essential virtue of
resolving disputes straightaway,” whereas permitting “full-bore legal and evidentiary
appeals” would render arbitration “merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and timeconsuming judicial review process” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kyocera
Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003))).
368. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model
of Arbitration, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 39, 52–61 (1999) (arguing that the rules of the major
arbitration organizations have become highly judicialized); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 11–20 (2010) (arguing that
arbitration increasingly employs litigation-like procedures, including discovery and
hearings).
369. Cf. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1796 (1996) (identifying
“norms that transactors follow in attempting to cooperatively resolve disputes in a manner
that will not jeopardize future dealings”); Stone, Rustic Justice, supra note 7, at 1024–30
(arguing that arbitration is most appropriate for disputes between the members of “selfregulating normative communities”).
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worth reemphasizing that, in any kind of dispute, the standard for
showing an abuse of delegated power would be a strict one, such that the
majority of arbitral decisions would in practice be final. In the end,
though, we inevitably face a tradeoff between benefits to private parties
and costs to public values whenever we delegate state power. A delegationpolicing approach better accounts for both the benefits and the costs of
arbitration’s delegations than does the current regime.
CONCLUSION
For solutions to some of the most vexing problems with arbitration,
we should look to civil procedure. Scholars have rightly worried that
arbitration delegates state power to private parties. What they’ve missed,
however, is that a similar delegation problem has already been rehearsed
in ordinary civil litigation. One of the most distinctive features of the
American civil justice system is that it allows private parties to exercise
signiﬁcant coercive power without prior judicial approval; it is a relatively
small step to conceptualize those private exercises of power as delegations of state power. Responding to the potential for its delegations to be
abused, civil procedure contains numerous doctrines that, rather than
restrict access to delegated power before any abuse has occurred, allow
the state to distance itself after the fact from exercises of delegated power
that offend especially important public values. Civil procedure has even
articulated a normative rationale for these delegation-policing doctrines:
the need for the state (and the political community it serves) to avoid
complicity in private wrongdoing. So the fundamental problem with arbitration isn’t that it delegates state power per se, but that it lacks the kinds
of delegation-policing doctrines found throughout civil procedure. Once
we grasp this major ﬂaw in the current arbitration regime, we can move
beyond the dichotomy between permitting private parties to abuse
arbitration’s delegations with virtual impunity, as current doctrine does,
and putting strict ex ante limits on those delegations, as most critics of
arbitration advocate. Even if arbitration clauses continue to be enforced
more often than arbitration’s critics think legitimate, we can still address
many of the concerns about arbitration by expanding judicial review of
arbitral awards and proceedings to enable courts to police arbitration’s
delegations, just as they already police civil procedure’s.
Why have scholars overlooked this deep continuity between arbitration and ordinary civil litigation? This Article concludes by venturing a
possible diagnosis and a prescription.
The diagnosis is the near monopoly procedural due process enjoys
on normative questions in civil procedure. An analytical framework that
is self-consciously preoccupied with the procedures of state institutions is
bound to neglect crucial issues when we’re assessing the exercise of coercive power by private parties. Notwithstanding this blind spot, scholars
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continue to analyze procedural questions primarily in due process
terms.370 That approach will prove at best incomplete, eliding important
issues raised by the privatization of the state’s dispute-resolution powers.
For the same reasons, procedural due process also glosses over core features of ordinary civil litigation, which casts the state in a supporting role
as often as a leading one.
The prescription, as this Article has sought to demonstrate, is a
greater focus in civil procedure scholarship on liberal political theory
and its account of political power. Scholars commonly turn to liberal
political theory to understand other areas of the law, particularly constitutional law371 and criminal law. 372 And it has even made some signiﬁcant
inroads into civil procedure, as scholars have invoked liberal-democratic
values to justify various aspects of civil litigation.373 But liberal political
theory’s account of political power has been virtually absent from debates
about the privatization of civil justice. That is unfortunate. Civil procedure is one of the primary ways political power gets exercised in our
society. As such, it raises all the same questions that attend the exercise of
political power in any other institutional setting—the boundary between
public and private foremost among them. At the same time, civil procedure inﬂects these age-old questions with its unique division of labor
between private parties and state officials. Liberal political theory can
thus help us to more fruitfully conceptualize some of the problems with
recent procedural trends, as well as to more readily apprehend the
solutions our civil justice system already has to offer.
370. See, e.g., Resnik, Contract, supra note 6, at 663–64 (“Contract Procedure
requires some oversight, through the lens of Due Process Procedure, because court-based
decisionmaking entails opportunities to be heard.”); see also supra notes 28, 334 and
accompanying text (advocating the extension of due process norms to arbitration).
371. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 1787, 1796–1801 (2005) (discussing “moral and political legitimacy” as an aspect of
“constitutional legitimacy”); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social
Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725, 726 (1998)
(exploring the connections between constitutional law and theories of rights).
372. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88
Calif. L. Rev. 687, 700 (2000) (“This is fairly good proof that criminal theory seems to
function today as a potpourri of political theory.”); V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing
Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1691, 1703–26 (2003) (analyzing criminal law
defenses in terms of political theory).
373. For a recent example, see generally Alexandra Lahav, In Praise of Litigation
(2017). Under the early inﬂuence of Lea Brilmayer, personal-jurisdiction scholarship has
also incorporated many insights from political theory. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism,
Community, and State Borders, 41 Duke L.J. 1, 1 (1991) (analyzing personal jurisdiction
in terms of political theory); George A. Rutherglen, Personal Jurisdiction and Political
Authority (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2017-13, 2017) (same),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2951109 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). And Martin
Redish has criticized the contemporary class action from a similar perspective. See
generally Martin H. Redish, Wholesale Justice: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem
of the Class Action Lawsuit (2009).
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